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MAPPING THE CONCEPTS BEHIND THE CONTEMPORARY 
LIBERALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JEAN D’ASPREMONT* 
It is hardly groundbreaking to suggest that the international 
legal order is enduring the corrosion of one of its most 
fundamental pillars: the prohibition on the use of force.  Each 
controversial use of force by a State has sparked predictions from 
international legal scholars envisaging the demise of this 
prohibition.1  While it would be inaccurate to conclude that the 
prohibition has been completely undermined, recent practice 
provides alarming indications that this is precisely the direction in 
which the prohibition is heading. 
The claim that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is on the brink of 
clinical death has already been heard—principally from legal 
realists.2  These grim accounts have also been endorsed by some 
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1 For an earlier controversy, see the famous debate between Thomas M. 
Franck and Louis Henkin.  See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: 
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970) 
[hereinafter Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?] (arguing that the prohibition against 
the use of force has been eroded beyond recognition).  But see Louis Henkin, The 
Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544, 544 
(1971) (arguing that while Article 2(4) is under assault, it is not dead).  Franck has 
grown even more pessimistic in recent years.  See Thomas M. Franck, What 
Happens Now?  The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 607–08 (2003) 
[hereinafter Franck, What Happens Now?] (discussing the relevance of the 
conclusion offered in his 1970 article in the context of the war on Iraq, where 
American leaders “boldly proclaim a new policy that openly repudiates the 
Article 2(4) obligation.”). 
2 See generally ANTHONY C. AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
75 (1999) (critiquing positivism by stating that it tends to place too much stock in 
the sanctity of treaties and illustrating that critique by citing states’ indifference 
toward Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter); Michael J. Glennon, The Collapse of 
Consent: Is a Legalist Use-of-Force Regime Possible?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (Beth 
A. Simmons ed., 2008); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (2005) (explaining that an action in contravention of the 
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liberal scholars.3  Such a bleak outlook has usually been resisted by 
those scholars who emphasize the overarching importance of opinio 
juris—the belief of States that international law prohibits the use of 
force irrespective of any corresponding conventional obligation4—
and interpret the deficiencies of the collective security system as 
grave but temporary.  These scholars believe that, although Article 
2(4) is, at worst, in intensive care, the situation is not life 
threatening for the system of collective security.5 
Whether on the brink of clinical death or in intensive care,6 
Article 2(4) is recognized unanimously as being in a state of grave 
weakness.  The analysis provided by this Article seeks to assess the 
precise extent of the frailty of the prohibition on the use force.  
While recognizing that this is not the first time that the demise of 
the collective security system has been foreshadowed, this Article 
seeks to examine the manner in and the concepts through which the 
contemporary enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use force is 
 
U.N. Charter is explained away as the first step in its revision); Anthony C. Arend, 
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 99–101 
(2003) (conceding that there exist customary prohibitions on the use of force, but 
asserting that such prohibitions fail to espouse the strong language of Article 
2(4)); Michael J. Glennon, The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter’s Use of Force Rules, 
27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 508 (2004) (explaining that though nations 
have not explicitly renounced Article 2(4), they have violated the U.N. Charter). 
3 See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, supra note 1, at 809 (illustrating the 
viewpoint that Article 2(4) rests on its deathbed); Henkin, supra note 1 (discussing 
the same proposition).  For a pessimistic account from non-liberal scholars, see 
Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT 
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 32 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) 
(concluding that the guarantee to refrain from the use of force, embodied in 
Article 2(4), does not work). 
4 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99–
100 (June 27) (finding that both parties agree that the principles regarding use of 
force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter correspond with principles of customary 
international law); see also Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order 
in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 622 (2003) (discussing that ideas of how 
states ought to behave can survive both “massive deviance” and an “almost total 
failure of application”). 
5 See Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 628, 631–33 (2008) (reflecting on how the Charter’s norms regarding 
permissible use of force have created a default rule of nonintervention, which has 
helped support global stability). 
6 See Emmanuelle Jouannet, French and American Perspectives on International 
Law: Legal Cultures and International Law, 58 ME. L. REV. 292, 313–14 (2006) (noting 
that cultural differences in the way in which the French and the Americans 
establish rules of customary international law are reflected within debates on the 
use of force). 
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unfolding and the potential impact of that phenomenon on the 
international legal order as a whole. 
Although this Article does not openly and purportedly 
embrace any particular vision of law, it is important to emphasize 
at this preliminary stage that each international legal scholar’s 
understanding of the state of the law on the use of force—
including the conception spelled out in this Article—remains 
deeply affected by each scholar’s respective conception of the rules 
regulating the use of force and the aspirations that each has vested 
in the collective security system.7  In particular, it could be argued 
that the looming enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use of 
force that is enunciated in this Article can, to a large extent, be 
explained as the outcome of the immoderate expectations vested in 
it by many scholars.  In this way, it may be that the contemporary 
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force is nothing more than 
what it naturally ought to be.8  It could simply be the end of the 
illusion conveyed by the optimism that followed the end of the 
Cold War.9  Accordingly, this Article acknowledges the relativity 
of its findings and comes to terms with their utter dependence on 
each scholar’s conception of the law and the collective security 
system.  As a result, this Article has the modest aim of shedding 
some light on the state of law ushered in by contemporary 
developments with a view to anticipating the consequences of a 
complete demise of the prohibition on the use of force for the 
international legal order as a whole. 
To achieve that goal, this Article follows a two-stage analysis.  
The Article starts by investigating the manner in which the 
 
7 On this question see generally Andrea Bianchi, The International Regulation 
of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretive Method, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 651 (2009) 
for a discussion on why “the method by which the discourse on the use of force is 
formed” must be reconsidered in light of diverging interpretative techniques 
currently employed by scholars. 
8 See Prosper Weil, Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité, 237 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9, 64–65 (1996) (stating that not all problems can be resolved by the law 
and suggesting that perhaps the reason why we are often disappointed by 
international law is that we expect too much of it).  A similar argument 
occasionally permeates realist accounts of the collective security system.  See, e.g., 
Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 990–91 (2005) 
(stating the realist perspective that international law, by overstating claims of its 
success and hiding when it fails, has diminished its own progress). 
9 See Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 609 (describing Article 2(4) 
as “miraculously reborn in a post-Cold War order”). 
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prohibition to use force is being incrementally corroded.  In 
particular, it argues that the evanescence of the rule expressed in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not stem from a conscious 
disregard for the prohibition on the use force since most States still 
feel constrained by it.  Instead, it is submitted that the 
disintegration of the prohibition on the use force results from a 
general striving for looser limitations on that prohibition.  This 
phenomenon is construed here as a liberalization of the use of force.  
Once it has been established how the prohibition on the use of 
force is being liberalized, this Article engages in a study of its 
consequences for the international legal order. 
It is important to stress at this point that, having the modest 
aim of formulating some thoughts on the forms and impact of a 
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force on the international 
legal order as a whole, this Article does not strive to contemplate 
the reasons why the prohibition on the use of force is vacillating.  
The study of the causes of the enfeeblement of that rule has already 
been undertaken elsewhere, especially in the realist international 
legal scholarship.  Yet, such studies have failed to focus on the 
question at hand; instead, they have been characterized by a 
conflation of the question as to why States obey the law with that 
of the existence or obligatory character of the law.  Indeed, many 
legal realists condition the existence or the obligatory character of 
the rule upon the reasons why States abide by its commands.  
According to these scholars, should a State no longer have any 
reason to abide by a rule, this means that the rule is either 
inexistent or no longer obligatory.10  By contrast, this Article rests 
on the assumption that the reasons why States abide by legal rules, 
their existence and the foundation of their obligatory character are 
three different questions, none of which have any direct bearing 
upon the subject central to this study.  As a result, they are not 
examined here.  In the same vein, this Article does not seek to 
evaluate whether the dilution of the rule enshrined in Article 2(4) 
of the U.N. Charter should be, as a matter of fact, bemoaned nor 
does it examine the reasons justifying whether such a rule ought to 
 
10 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 8, at 940 (suggesting that excessive violation 
of a rule of international law causes the rule to be replaced); see also Michael J. 
Glennon, Force and the Settlement of Political Disputes: Debate with Alain Pellet 
at the Colloquium of Topicality of the 1907 Hague Conference (Sept. 7, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092212 (discussing how repeated violations 
of international law have affected States’ legal obligations to obey these laws). 
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be preserved.  Such questions do not fall squarely within the ambit 
of legal expertise and are duly set aside for the purposes of this 
Article. 
Because this Article aims at appraising the forms and the 
consequences of the dilution of the prohibition on the use of force 
for the international legal order as a whole, Part 1 starts by spelling 
out the interconnections between the prohibition on the use of 
force, the collective security system, and the international legal 
order.  The Article then tries to demonstrate that the dilution of the 
prohibition on the use of force does not stem from any attempt to 
unravel the prohibition itself, but from a general endeavor for 
looser limitations to that prohibition.  Part 2 accordingly embarks 
on an examination of the enduring character of the prohibition on 
the use of force.  Part 3 then sheds some light on how the use of 
force is being dismantled through a severe loosening of its 
limitations.  Part 4 offers a general appraisal of the extent of the 
dilution of the prohibition.  In Part 5, the Article eventually 
provides some thoughts on the consequences of the vanishing of 
the prohibition on the use of force for the international legal order 
as a whole. 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 
THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, AND THE PROHIBITION ON THE 
USE OF FORCE 
The international legal order has preceded the emergence of a 
collective security system, which itself has preceded the advent of 
a prohibition on the use of force.  Therefore, these notions are all 
autonomous in the sense that none of them is a constitutive 
element of the other.  In particular, an international legal order 
rests neither on the existence of a collective security system, nor of 
a prohibition on the use of force.  This is well illustrated by the 
existence of international legal relations among states long before 
the creation of the League of Nations, which is widely considered 
the first rudimentary collective security system,11 although its 
 
11 See ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918–
1935, 2 (Atheneum Publishers, 2d ed. 1969) (explaining that the common purpose 
of all nations associated with the establishment of the League of Nations was to 
construct a security machinery to prevent the recurrence of another World War); 
see also C.K. WEBSTER & SYDNEY HERBERT, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 301 (1933) (contending that the League of Nations was primarily 
conceived as a “compact to maintain peace”); F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE 
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systemic dimension has sometimes been portrayed as an illusion.12  
The League of Nations also demonstrated that a collective security 
system can be set up without a prohibition on the use of force.13 
Although independent from one another, these notions are 
intertwined and act to reinforce each other.  The most obvious 
interconnection among them is the finding that the existence of a 
collective security system fosters the viability of the international 
legal order as a whole.  In essence, the collective security system 
can tame and elevate the use of force to an enforcement mechanism of the 
international legal order.  Indeed, it is not contested that the 
collective security system can transform war into a coercive 
mechanism that can be used for the enforcement of law.  For 
Kelsen, this enforcement mechanism even constitutes one of the 
constitutive elements of the international legal order.14  There are, 
of course, various degrees in which a collective security system can 
instrumentalize war with a view to making it a law-enforcement 
tool.  For instance, the pre-League of Nations collective security 
system, founded on the predominance, alliance, and congresses of 
the Great Powers, did little to provide an effective law-enforcement 
mechanism, for it was crippled by an overly fickle balance of 
powers.15  Under the League of Nations, war became a law-
 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 (1952) (stating that the League of Nations is the 
“embodiment in constitutional form of mankind’s aspirations towards peace and 
towards a rationally organized world”). 
12 See David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 842, 988 
(1987) (illustrating the critical legal school’s belief that the League of Nations 
system existed as an illusion to alleviate the frustration of a war fought in vain). 
13 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10–16 (laying out the ways in which 
members of the League can deal with acts of aggression or threats of such acts by 
other Member States without specifically prohibiting the use of force in 
international disputes). 
14 See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1952) (explaining 
that if there were a total prohibition on the use of force without the possibility of 
forcible actions as sanctions, international law would cease to be a legal order); 
Jörg Kammerhofer, Kelsen—Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to 
International Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 225, 230–31 (2009) (discussing Kelsen’s 
interpretation that war exists as either “delict or sanction within positive 
international law”). 
15 See F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
IN THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 301 (1963) (stating that the 
displacement of the older power structure by impersonal forces created instability 
and tension between the Great Powers in the years prior to the League of 
Nations); George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: 
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 335–36 (1998) (noting that 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/2
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enforcement tool only to a limited extent; the League being mostly 
devoted to proceduralizing violence rather than instrumentalizing 
it.16  By contrast, the U.N. collective security system—although it 
was put on hold during the Cold War and was not able to function 
properly as a means of enforcement until the fall of the Berlin 
Wall17—offers the possibility to use war as an enforcement 
procedure.18  To a significant extent, the U.N. system is a structure 
devoted to maintaining the international legal order.19  In that 
sense, the U.N. mechanism contradicts any Austinian type of 
objection that international law is not law because it lacks a 
coercive enforcement mechanism.20  While the U.N. collective 
 
the fragmented agreements made by the Great Powers could not have prevented 
the Great War). 
16 See FÉODOR KORÉNITCH, L’ARTICLE 10 DU PACTE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS 
(1931) (discussing Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations).  See 
generally U.N. LIBRARY AT GENEVA, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1920–1946—
ORGANIZATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE OF THE FIRST 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD PEACE, U.N. Doc. 
LIB/96/6, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.96.0.25 (1996) (detailing the historical foundations 
and developments of the League of Nations). 
17 But cf. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950) (illustrating the 
operation of the Security Council, an integral part of the U.N. collective security 
system, in the face of armed attacks on the Republic of Korea by North Korean 
forces).  See Nico J. Schrijver, The Future of the Charter of the United Nations, 10 MAX 
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 11 (2006) (discussing how the end of the Cold War signified 
a turning point for the U.N.). 
18 See David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299, 317 (2000) 
(noting, for example, how the U.S. military took actions tantamount to acts of war 
against Iraq during the Gulf War as a means of supporting the “inspection and 
sanctions regime” imposed by the U.N. Security Council); see also HANS KELSEN, 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL 
PROBLEMS 736 (1950) (discussing the ability of the Security Council to direct its 
action against a state responsible for a threat to peace and is free to determine 
what constitutes a threat and then issue a legally binding “order” demanding that 
the state take a certain course of action); Kammerhofer, supra note 14, at 245 
(explaining that coercive actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
are not necessarily responses to wrongs by Member States and are therefore not 
inconsistent with the Preamble of the Charter). 
19 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple—Order, Justice and the U.N.: 
A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1995) (detailing the tension between the 
goal of maintaining order and that of maintaining justice at the U.N.). 
20 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE 
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 201 (Hackett Publishing Co., 1998) (positing 
that international law is improperly called law because it is set by general opinion, 
whereas positive law is set by a sovereign).  But see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A 
LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 3–43, 93–120 (2d 
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security system clearly instrumentalizes war and allows it to be 
used as a law-enforcement tool, it must be noted that this is only 
true as long as the rule that one seeks to enforce through the U.N. 
enforcement procedure dovetails with the objective of peace and 
security of the U.N., and more particularly, that the violation of the 
rule whose enforcement is sought may potentially constitute a 
threat to international peace and security.21  In other words, it is 
only as early as the infringement of a given rule simultaneously 
constitutes a threat to the international peace and security that one 
can contemplate resorting to the U.N. collective security system to 
enforce international law.22 
The requirement that the enforcement of a rule through the 
U.N. system must simultaneously contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security in order for the U.N. collective 
security to be deemed a law-enforcement system, should not be 
exaggerated. 
Recent practice has shown that the qualification of Security 
Council resolutions have been loosely applied and have 
encapsulated situations where clear violations of international law 
have been committed.  This is generally the case when the Security 
Council seeks to sanction what it qualifies an “aggressive act,” “act 
of aggression,” or “aggression.”23  This is also true in the case of a 
 
ed., 1980) (criticizing Austin’s views on legal systems and comparing it with 
Kelsen’s theory of legal systems). 
21 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”). 
22 See id.; see also Pierre d’Argent et al., Article 39, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS 
UNIES: COMMENTAIRES ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1133–70 (Jean-Pierre Cot et al. eds., 3d 
ed. 2005) (discussing the competence of the Security Council to determine threats 
against peace, breach of peace, and acts of agression). 
23 See S.C. Res. 326, U.N. Doc. S/RES/326 (Feb. 2, 1973) (addressing what the 
Security Council deemed to be “provocative and aggressive acts” committed by 
Southern Rhodesia against other countries, including Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, and Zambia); S.C. Res. 387, U.N. Doc. S/RES/387 (Mar. 31, 1976) 
(regarding the acts of aggression committed by South Africa against other 
countries in southern Africa); S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977) 
(regarding the acts of armed aggression committed by mercenaries against Benin); 
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (regarding the acts of aggression 
committed by Israel against Tunisia); S.C. Res. 611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (Apr. 
25, 1988) (condemning the acts of aggression committed by Israel against Tunisia); 
S.C. Res. 667, U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (Sept. 16, 1990) (regarding the acts of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/2
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humanitarian disaster that qualifies as a threat to international 
peace and security, or in situations concerning numerous 
violations of both humanitarian as well as human rights law.24  It 
must be conceded that, in these situations, violations of 
international law have never been per se equated by the Security 
Council to threats to international peace and security.  However, 
the Security Council, whose mandate is not to determine whether 
international law has been breached, has nonetheless considered 
that situations where there have been blatant violations of 
international law constitute threats to international peace.25  This is 
also clearly the case when sanctions are applied by the Council to 
States or entities which have failed to comply with the Council’s 
own compulsory injunctions.26  While one can still dispute the 
extent to which the U.N. Security Council serves as a coercive 
enforcement mechanisms of international law as a whole, it seems 
indisputable that the U.N. collective security system can 
potentially provide a new avenue for the enforcement of 
international law as a whole. 
The relationship between the prohibition on the use of force 
and the international legal order is probably more difficult to 
fathom.  Indeed, as was previously stated, a prohibition on the use 
of force does not constitute a constitutive element of a legal order.  
One can easily conceive of an international legal order that is 
devoid of any prohibition on the use of force, as illustrated by the 
indisputable existence in international relations of orders that can 
reasonably be deemed legal before the advent of any prohibition 
 
aggression committed by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in 
Kuwait). 
24 For examples of resolutions pertaining to the situation in Kosovo, see S.C. 
Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); 
S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).  For the situation in Darfur, see S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
25 For the situation in Rwanda, see S.C. Res. 929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 
22, 1994), or for the situation in Somalia, see S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 
(Jan. 23, 1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
26 See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (imposing sanctions 
on Libya for failing to comply with S.C. Res. 731 (1992)).  See generally S.C. Res. 
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (adopting sanctions against Iran for, 
inter alia, failing to comply with S.C. Res. 1696 (2006)). 
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on the use of force.  This does not mean that the existence or the 
absence of a prohibition on the use of force is without 
consequences for the international legal order as a whole.  This 
accords with H.L.A. Hart’s famous assertion that the restriction of 
violence constitutes “the minimum content of natural law,” that is, 
a rule of conduct that any social organization must contain to be 
“viable.”27  That a legal order must somehow limit the use of 
violence so as not to be beset by chaos and ineptitude does not 
mean that the use of force must necessarily be prohibited.  It could 
even be argued that the total absence of any legal limitation on the 
use of force may be offset by some moral or political postulates and 
in fact helps the legal order in question to remain viable.  In that 
sense, the “just war” moral limitations pre-existing the League of 
Nations, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and 
the U.N. Charter limitations on the use of force, although falling 
short of reflecting legal standards, may have played, together with 
the complex pre-League alliances system, the role of limiting the 
use of violence and contributing to the viability of the international 
legal order as a whole. 
A prohibition on the use of force not only helps bolster the 
viability of a legal order, it can also be instrumental in the 
preservation of some of the main tenets of that legal order.  With 
respect to the international legal order in particular, it can be 
argued that, by forbidding violence among sovereign States, the 
prohibition on the use of force is aimed at the preservation of the 
Westphalian order.  Indeed, what the prohibition is meant to 
preserve in this case is a given configuration of the international 
community and the legal order that corresponds with it.  
According to Article 2(4), States are prohibited from invading, 
occupying, annexing, and eliminating other sovereign States.28  
 
27 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–94 (1961).  This statement has often 
been abused in order to reconcile Hart and Dworkin and defend the idea that 
Hart had eventually elevated some minimum standards of morality into a 
condition of validity or a condition of the obligatory character of law.  Hart, 
however, never construed his “minimum content of morality” as a constitutive 
element of valid or obligatory law.  For an example of this misinterpretation of 
Hart, see Kenneth E. Himma, Hart and Austin Together Again for the First Time: 
Coercive Enforcement and the Theory of Legal Obligation 17 (SSRN Working Papers, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=727465. 
28 But see Pierre d’Argent, Which Law Through Which War? Law Through War 
Revisited, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that although initially prohibiting 
war, international law, and most notably the U.N. Charter, has begun to legalize 
it). 
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Article 2(4) thus shelters the current State-based configuration of 
the world and the legal order that rests upon it.  This is probably 
why the International Court of Justice has long been so prone to 
defend a very robust understanding of the prohibition on the use 
of force, both in its conventional29 and customary30 dimensions. 
As has been contended, the prohibition on the use of force is 
not a necessary condition to the legal character of the international 
order.  Nor is the prohibition on the use of force a constitutive 
element of any collective security system.  A collective security 
system can be set up and prove viable without force being 
simultaneously prohibited.  This is well-illustrated by the fact that 
the League of Nations did not rest on any sort of prohibition, the 
use of force only being subjected to some multilateral procedural 
requirements under the League System.31  The foregoing means 
that a collective security system is entirely conceivable short of any 
prohibition on the use of force and the relationship between the 
prohibition and the collective security system is not one of mutual 
reinforcement.  The opposite could even be reasonably defended.  
It can be argued that the prohibition on the use of force can 
actually hinder the efficacy of a collective security system.  Indeed, 
if utterly unqualified—that is if the prohibition does not allow any 
multilateral use of force—the prohibition on the use force can even 
demote the collective security system to a mere political forum 
where questions of peace and security are discussed but no police 
measures can be taken.  It is well known that the current 
prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, which mirrors customary international law,32 only limits 
the use of force and does not prohibit it completely, for the rule 
contains an exception both outside and inside the U.N. collective 
 
29 See Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit., N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (stating 
that the alleged “right of intervention” is a “manifestation of a policy of force” 
which “cannot . . . find a place in international law”). 
30 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97–
101, paras. 184–90 (June 27) (holding that customary international law requires the 
non-use of force). 
31 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10–16 (offering only an advisory role 
in responding to military activity). 
32 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 92–98, paras. 172–85 
(holding that the United States’ argument that the U.N. Charter is the sole basis 
upon which claims of international law may be made is incorrect). 
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system.33  In that sense, it is only as long as the prohibition on the 
use of force leaves room for exceptions in the form of multilateral 
uses of force that it allows an efficacious collective security system 
to exist. 
The prohibition on the use of force, although neither a 
constitutive element of any legal order nor of any collective 
security system, nonetheless has the ability to impact the viability, 
efficacy and configuration of both the international legal order and 
the collective security system.  Accordingly, the last part of this 
Article appraises the impact of the dilution of the prohibition on 
the use force on each of these notions.  First, however, such an 
appraisal requires a preliminary assessment of both the extent of 
the actual enfeeblement of the prohibition on the use of force and 
of its impact on the collective security system. 
2. AN ENDURING PROHIBITION 
Recent practice, especially that pertaining to the so-called fight 
against terrorism,34 has provided some worrisome examples of 
situations in which the use force by a State short of any 
authorization by the Security Council has remained unchallenged.  
If the blatant trumping of international law in Kosovo35 and Iraq36 
constituted the only exceptions, one could still live with the 
illusion of an international legal order where force remains strictly 
prohibited despite occasional patent violations.  However, the 
violations of the prohibition of the use of force in Kosovo and Iraq 
have been corroborated ever since. 
 
33 See infra note 65 (detailing those circumstances when the use of force is 
permitted). 
34 See P. Klein, Le droit international à l’épreuve du terrorisme, 321 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 203 (2006) (assessing the legal problems pertaining to the use of force in the 
context of the fight against terrorism). 
35 See generally KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL 
ASSESSMENT (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002) (examining the future of Kosovo in 
light of the Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999 and the Stability Pact adopted 
to ensure economic recovery of the entire region). 
36 See generally Richard A. Falk, What Future for the U.N. Charter System of War 
Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 590 (2003) (describing the United States’ 
circumvention of the U.N.’s prohibition of force in Iraq); Franck, What Happens 
Now?, supra note 1 (describing the self-interest of super-powers winning out over 
international obligations, post-Iraq).  See also John Yoo, International Law and the 
War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2003) (reconciling the war in Iraq with the 
principles of international law). 
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Recently, in an attack first attributed to the United States,37 
Israel used force in Sudan without stirring much debate or 
condemnation and without clearly falling within the classical rules 
of self-defense.38  Likewise, since Israel bombed alleged nuclear 
sites in Syria in September 2007, there has hardly been any 
response questioning the legality of the Israeli bombardment.39  
The possible covert development of nuclear weapons on the site 
has not even been invoked as a possible justification.40  In the same 
vein, when Turkish troops swept into Iraqi Kurdistan, there were 
very few States challenging the legality of the Turkish 
intervention.41  By the same token, recent military operations by 
foreign troops in Somalia have stirred no concern as to their 
accordance with international law.42  These few particular 
examples have been corroborated by some principled positions 
expressed by States.  For instance, some powerful nations have 
unwaveringly professed that they do not feel bound by any sort of 
constraints when their security is at stake.43  It is also noteworthy 
that the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002 
famously provides enormous leeway for the President to use force 
to prevent acts of terrorism on the exclusive basis of a self-
assessment of the threat without any reference to the classical 
 
37 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Says U.S. Airstrike Killed Dozens in Convoy, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 27, 2009, at 5 (describing the confusion of whether the 
attacks on Sudan were undertaken by the United States or Israel). 
38 See Israel Hit Convoy in Sudan, US Officials Say, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28–
29, 2009. 
39 See David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Analysts Find Israel Struck a Syrian 
Nuclear Project, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A1 (questioning Israel’s justifications 
for attacking Sudan). 
40 See U.N. Detects Processed Uranium at Syrian Site, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 
20, 2009 (reporting that recent samples taken by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency have shown signs of processed uranium on the site). 
41 See Sebnem Arsu & Stephen Farrell, Turkey Says Its Raids in Iraq Have Killed 
More Than 150 Kurdish Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A8 (debating the 
grounds for the airstrike). 
42 Somali Rebels Slam U.S. Killing of al Qaeda Suspect, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF424326. 
43 See Press Release, The White House, President George Bush Discusses Iraq 
in National Press Conference (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html (“I am 
confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if 
we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to 
do so. . . .  When it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s 
permission.”). 
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conditions of self-defense.44  Under this view, modern threats and 
the development of tactical weapons seemingly conveyed the 
illusion of so-called “chirurgical” strikes with few causalities,45 had 
liberated States from the burden of international law and 
convinced them that their imperative political motives can more 
easily outweigh their obligation not to use force under the U.N. 
Charter. 
However ominous this practice may appear, it is argued that 
the silence of the international community in these cases does not 
suffice to demonstrate a complete disintegration of the prohibition 
on the use of force.46  First, the violations of the prohibition 
constitute the only tangible practice available.  The extent to which 
States consciously refrain from using force is imperceptible, 
impalpable, and hence, immeasurable.47  Moreover, States still 
seem to manifest a significant attachment to the principle of the 
prohibition on the use of force.  Despite some notable recent 
exceptions,48 States using force in ambiguous circumstances still 
 
44 See Press Release, The White House, National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov 
/documents/organization/15538.pdf (providing an overview of America’s 
international strategy); Falk, supra note 36, at 593 (describing the leaning of 
powerful nations to feel exonerated from the prohibition to use force); see also 
Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 619 (finding that the U.S.’s National 
Security Strategy redefined the concept of self-defense to take into account the 
exigencies of modern terrorism). 
45 See Anthony D’Amato, Megatrends in the Use of Force, in 71 INT’L L. STUDIES, 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 1–16 (Michael N. 
Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., Naval War College) (1998) (describing these 
developments). 
46 See Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of 
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L 621, 622-27 (2003) (describing the impact of violations on the 
state of the law and indicating that use of force does not suggest and erosion of 
international law). 
47 See ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE 
OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 180 (Routledge 1993) (“While it is 
easy to count the times that a particular norm is violated, it is quite difficult to 
identify the times when a norm exerted a controlling influence, when states 
refrained from forcible action because of Article 2(4)’s proscription.”). 
48 See generally Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 608 (arguing that 
nowadays, states do not even bother to use a “fig leaf of legal justification”).  Also 
note the particular example provided by the Special Commission of Investigation 
about the decision of the Netherlands to support the war against Iraq which 
concluded that the Netherlands deemed it unnecessary to seek a mandate from 
the Security Council.  Gilbert Kreijger, Iraq Invasion Had No Legal Backing: Dutch 
Report, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2010, at 1,  http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid 
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strive to justify their deeds by referring to the rules of international 
law pertaining to the use of force.49  Recent and authoritative 
scholarly work further underpins that conclusion.50  This 
continuous attachment to the prohibition on the use of force, 
however, does not mean that the aforementioned examples are 
negligible and marginal.  Indeed, it is argued here that the 
utilizations of force referred to above betray the deep ailment of 
the collective security system, which is being undermined by a 
fading prohibition on the use of force. 
Legal scholars are divided regarding the normative status of a 
prohibition on the use of force, that is, whether the prohibition 
constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.  Indeed, there 
is no scholarly consensus on whether the prohibition on the use of 
force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter constitutes a 
peremptory norm of international law.51  There is also 
disagreement as to the normative character of the rule regulating 
self-defense.52  Such a controversy seems to have pervaded the 
work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”).  Indeed, the 
 
=USTRE60B3A620100112  (reporting on the Dutch government’s support of a 
United States led invasion of Iraq that had no legal backing). 
49 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar, v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 
186 (June 27) (noting that a state’s use of rules and exceptions to rules to defend its 
use of force confirms rather than weakens the rule); U.K. Foreign Secretary, Iraq: 
Legal Basis for the Use of Force, 2003 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 793, 793–96 (describing the 
use of force following the liberation of Iraq). 
50 See generally OLIVIER CORTEN, LE DROIT CONTRE LA GUERRE: L’INTERDICTION 
DU RECOURS À LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPORAIN (Pedone 2008) 
(claiming that the rule prohibiting the use of force has undergone significant 
change since September 11, 2001). 
51 See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2) (1996) available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk 
/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.php#4 [hereinafter Articles on 
State Responsibility] (containing the former Article 19 of the ILC which seems to 
indicate that only the prohibition of aggression is ius cogens); see also 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. 
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/589 (Jan. 28, 2002) (containing Article 27 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility, which excludes the invocation of circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness in case of violation of peremptory norms, if read in 
conjunction with Article 22, Article 27 seems to limit the peremptory character to 
the prohibition of aggression). 
52 See Antonio Cassese, Article 51, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, 
COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1357 (Jean-Pierre Cot et al. eds.) (2005).  Cf. 
Raphaël van Steenberghe, Le Pacte de non-agression et de défense commune de l’Union 
africaine: entre unilatéralisme et responsabilité collective, 113 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INT’L PUB. 125 (2009). 
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ILC itself has been alternating between asserting that it is endowed 
with a ius cogens character,53 that the status is to be reserved to the 
prohibition of aggression,54 or that it did not need to take a position 
on the issue.55  Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility 
seems to consider the prohibition on the use of force as one of the 
peremptory obligations of international law.56  It would be of no 
avail to take on that debate here.57 
For the sake of this Article, it suffices to underscore that, at first 
glance, it may seem odd, if not paradoxical, that scholars are 
quibbling over the peremptory character of the prohibition at a 
time when the collective security system is deeply damaged.  
Largely, the attribution of a peremptory character to the 
prohibition on the use of force reflects the whims of a legal 
scholarship that is deluded by the constitutionalist character of the 
U.N. Charter58 and which sees in the prohibition on the use of force 
the overarching principle of an emerging international 
constitutional order.59 
 
53 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-second 
Session, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, 270 (1980) (stating that the Commission was 
unsure as to whether communications were made and whether they were 
operative). 
54 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51 (containing the former 
Article 19 which prohibits force except in the most serious of circumstances). 
55 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second 
session, 35 GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 27–28, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in 2 
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 26 U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2) 
(discussing the ILC’s work of codifying the rules governing State responsibility). 
56 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 50 
(“Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or 
use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Obligations for 
the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) Obligations of a humanitarian 
character prohibiting reprisals; (d) Other obligations under peremptory norms of 
general international law.”). 
57 For an extensive discussion of the question, see CORTEN, supra note 50, at 
293–385 (discussing the use of force in contemporary international law). 
58 See, e.g., BARDO FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS 
CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1 (2009) (addressing the legal 
consequences of viewing the U.N. charter as a constitution for the international 
community). 
59 See generally Jean d’Aspremont, International Law in Asia: The Limits to the 
Western Constitutionalist and Liberal Doctrines, 13 ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L., 89 (2008) 
(criticizing the constitutionalist understanding of international law); Jean 
d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the International Legal Order, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L 
L. 1, 7 (2007) (challenging the idea of a constitutionalist legal order); Wouter 
Werner, The Never Ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law, in 
NIKOLAUS K. TSAGOURIAS, TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL 
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This squabbling over the peremptory character of the 
prohibition on the use of force is not deemed futile here because of 
the very modest consequences of ius cogens in international law.  It 
is true that ius cogens only invalidates subsequent conflicting 
conventions,60 terminates prior conflicting conventions,61 obliges 
States not to recognize its serious breach and to cooperate to put an 
end to it,62 and bars the invocation of circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness in case of a breach.63  However limited and modest, 
the effects of ius cogens may prove to be fundamentally important 
to the limitations to the prohibition on the use of force.  The 
determination of the normative character of the prohibition on the 
use of force is of fundamental avail in other respects.  Indeed, the 
question whether circumstances precluding wrongfulness—
especially the state of necessity64—may be invoked to exclude the 
wrongfulness of an illegal use of force creates a new possibility for 
States to illegally use force without incurring responsibility.  We 
shall briefly revert to this issue in the next section. 
The reason why the debate about the peremptory status of the 
prohibition on the use of force seems somewhat overblown 
pertains to the assumption made here that the peremptory 
character of the prohibition to use force does not constitute a 
rampart against the current challenges of the collective security 
system.  In other words, even if the prohibition on the use of force, 
on which the collective security system rests, were to be a norm of 
ius cogens, its peremptory character would not shield it against the 
perils brought about by attempts to enlarge its limitations.  It is 
precisely because of the irrelevance of the ius cogens character of 
 
AND EUROPEAN MODELS 329 (Cambridge University Press 2007) (using 
constitutionalist language to explain existing developments in international law). 
60 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of international law.”). 
61 See id. art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates.”). 
62 See Responsibility of States, supra note 51, art. 41 (“A State whose conduct 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act having a continuing character is under 
die obligation to cease that conduct, without consequences of invoking prejudice 
to the responsibility it has already incurred.”). 
63 See id. art. 27 (discussing a circumstance precluding wrongfulness). 
64 See id. art. 25 (explaining that breach of an international obligation starts at 
the moment that act begins). 
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the prohibition in relation to the possibility of stretching its 
limitations that it is fundamental to gauge the extent to which 
States have resorted to abusive understandings of these limitations.  
It is the aim of the following section to describe the debilitation of 
the collective security system that originates in attempts to broaden 
the limitations under which a resort to force is allowed. 
3. SUBVERTING THE LIMITATIONS TO THE PROHIBITION TO USE 
FORCE 
This section sketches out the concepts through which the 
current liberalization of the use of force is being carried out.  It 
does not seek to offer comprehensive analysis of each one, for this 
has already been done in the literature.  However, general 
mappings of the various conceptual manners in which the 
prohibition to use force is being liberalized in contemporary 
international law are scarce.  The following paragraphs intend to 
fill that gap. 
A preliminary remark must be formulated about terminology.  
This Article construes the situations where force can legally be 
used under current international law as “limitations.”  The term 
“limitation” seems better suited than the term “exception” or 
“qualification” in the sense that the situations where the use of 
force is allowed do not, strictly speaking, derogate from the 
prohibition.  They simply limit its ambit.  Likewise, the situations 
where force can lawfully be used, although being enshrined in 
provisions scattered throughout the entire U.N. Charter, can be 
seen as constitutive parts of a single rule.  Envisaging the 
prohibition on the use of force as one single legal rule embracing 
the multilateral use of force authorized by the Security Council as 
well as the concept of self-defense enshrined in both Article 51 and 
customary international law also underpins the use of the term 
limitation instead of exception.  Such terminology is also reflected 
in the case law of the International Court of Justice, which, in its 
decision in the Oil Platforms case, ceased to consider self-defense an 
exception to the prohibition to use force and qualified it a 
“limitation.”65 
 
65 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183 (Nov. 6) (“[i]f a measure 
is to be qualified as self-defence . . . the criteria of necessity and proportionality 
must be observed.”).  It is interesting to note that prior to that judgment, the Court 
considered self-defense an “exception” to the prohibition on the use of force.  See 
Pierre d’Argent, Du Commerce à l’Emploi de la Force: L’Affaire des Plates-Formes 
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The attempt by States to justify their use of force (or their 
intention to do so) through a resort to the limitations to the 
prohibition has manifested itself in two ways.  First, States have 
invoked new limitations to justify their resort to military force.  In 
particular, they have referred to the concept of humanitarian 
intervention as well as that of pro-democratic intervention to 
support the legality of their military action.  At the same time, they 
have been prone to broadening the scope of the existing 
limitations, namely the right to use force in self-defense or upon 
prior authorization by the Security Council.  Besides invoking new 
limitations or expanding existing limitations, States have also tried 
to argue that their use of force is not prohibited by Article 2(4) of 
the U.N. Charter and the corresponding customary rule because 
they have been invited by the State’s government onto the territory 
on which force is actually used.  Finally, even when their actions 
are undoubtedly at odds with the prohibition on the use of force 
and do not fit into one of its exceptions, States have tried to evade 
the correlative responsibility for their illegal conduct by invoking 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and particularly the state 
of necessity.  Each of these arguments has gained much credence 
among States as well as legal scholars, which explains why each of 
them must now be examined briefly. 
It is important to point out, preliminarily, that resorting to the 
aforementioned arguments is not an entirely new phenomenon.  
On the contrary, contemporary endeavors to float new limitations 
on the prohibition on the use of force, to stretch the ambit of the 
current limitations, to deem oneself duly invited by the 
government, or to evade responsibility by invoking a state of 
necessity, convey a strong sense of “déjà vu.”  Indeed, as was 
demonstrated by the practice during the Cold War, these 
arguments were always heard when the Security Council was 
structurally paralyzed.  This is not to say that the Security Council 
is now utterly passive and incapable of authorizing the use of 
force.  When it comes to ordering economic sanctions against 
States,66 groups of individuals,67 lone individuals,68 or to policing 
 
Pétrolières (Arrêt sur le Fond) [Trade in the Use of Force: The Oil Platforms Case 
(Decision on the Merits)] 49 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 266 (2003) 
(discussing the Oil Platforms Case and its implications on international trade). 
66 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 986, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995) (setting 
forth the Oil-for-Food program in Iraq). 
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the seas,69 recent practice has shown that the Council is extremely, 
if not overly, active,70 being sometimes oblivious to the elementary 
requirement of the rule of law.71  The resemblance between today’s 
practice and the immobility of the Council during the Cold War 
nonetheless lies in its lasting reluctance to yield to the request for 
authorizations from its most bellicose members.  After a short 
interlude in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the Council has quickly reverted to evincing great prudence and is 
now very loathe to rubber-stamp the plans of its warmongering 
members.  It is the latter which, when confronted with the 
Council’s great tepidity to authorize the use of force, have been 
most prone to subvert the limitations to the prohibition on the use 
of force in order to justify their resort to armed force.  At a time 
when the Security Council was constantly idle, the harm caused by 
these arguments was limited.  However, since the end of the Cold 
 
67 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) 
(addressing international terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1698, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1698 (July 31, 2006) (explaining that the situation in the Congo is a threat 
to international security and peace in the region); S.C. Res. 1804, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1804 (Mar. 21, 2008) (demanding that armed groups in Congo lay down 
their arms); S.C. Res. 1807, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1807 (Mar. 31, 2008) (describing 
the situation in the Congo). 
68 See, e.g. S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004) 
(discussing the situation in Cote d’Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) (discussing the situation in Darfur); S.C. Res. 1706, ¶ 
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (deciding to support implementation of 
the Darfur peace agreement). 
69 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) 
(deciding to cooperate with the TFG to fight armed robbery and piracy off the 
Somalian coast). 
70 See Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
901, 902 (2002) (describing how the Security Council departed from its previous 
practice in responding to September 11, 2001); Stefan Talmon, The Security Council 
as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 177 (2005) (explaining that only generic 
resolutions should be described as international legislation). 
71 On the debate over the infringement of human rights by the U.N. Security 
Council and its effect in the regional legal orders, see Larissa van den Herik, The 
Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better Protection of the 
Individual, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 797, 797 (2007) (discussing regional legal orders 
and the infringement of human rights); Michael Bothe, Security Council’s Targeted 
Sanctions Against Presumed Terrorists: The Need to Comply with Human Rights 
Standards, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 541 (2008) (arguing for due process procedures 
for listing decisions and remedies against listing decisions).  On the specific 
problems caused by the implementation of these measures, see Jean d’Aspremont 
& Frederic Dopagne, Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary Divide Between 
Legal Orders, 5 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 371, 371–79 (2008) (describing the problems 
caused by implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/2
D’ASPREMONT.DOC 11/17/2010  2:58 PM 
2010] LIBERALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 1109 
 
War, the Security Council has no longer been paralyzed and has 
proved itself to be a fully workable machine.  In this context, the 
impact of the subversion of the limitations to the prohibition on the 
use of force is disastrous for the collective security system as a 
whole.  It is precisely for this reason that the contemporary practice 
described below, while not entirely unprecedented, carries far 
more dramatic consequences. 
3.1. New Limitations? 
Practice shows that States have not balked at resorting to two 
new limitations to the prohibition on the use of force alien to the 
U.N. collective security system: humanitarian intervention and 
pro-democratic intervention.  In addition, albeit in veiled terms, 
the International Court of Justice as well as the Institut de Droit 
international have both alluded to an additional limitation to the 
prohibition contained in the U.N. Charter, namely the possibility of 
measures involving the use of force in reaction to an initial use of 
force which falls below the threshold of an armed attack.  Since 
most of these limitations have already received extensive attention 
in the existing literature, these three limitations to the prohibition 
to use force are only outlined briefly. 
3.1.1. Humanitarian Intervention 
The most common non-U.N. limitation to the prohibition on 
the use of force on which States have relied to justify their 
unauthorized military actions is humanitarian intervention.72  
Although it has been expressly invoked by some States73 and 
supported by some scholars,74 it seems uncontested that positive 
 
72 See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (OUP, 2001) (discussing humanitarian 
intervention and the U.N. Charter). 
73 See KREIGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 25 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) (discussing 
the U.N. commission on Human Rights). 
74 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, STATE ACTION AGAINST 
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS, 135–69 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
(addressing humanitarian intervention).  Compare Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N., 
and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 14–21 (1999) (discussing a 
change in the relationship between the U.N. and NATO to competition and away 
from reinforcement), with Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving 
towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the 
World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 23 (1999) (“[W]here a number of stringent 
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international law does not enshrine anything close to an 
entitlement to use force in the case of a humanitarian disaster on 
the territory of another State.75  Even the vague political concept of 
the responsibility to protect falls short of recognizing any 
entitlement to use force in the absence of a Security Council 
authorization.76 
3.1.2. Pro-Democratic Intervention 
Another limitation that has been expressly or impliedly 
resorted to in practice is the concept of pro-democratic 
intervention.  According to this idea, States would be entitled to 
use force against another State in order to oust a non-democratic 
government.  The argument was invoked on the occasion of the 
American intervention in Grenada.77  Additionally, it was not 
totally absent from the political discourse in the aftermath of the 
war in Iraq in 2003 when the argument pertaining to preventive 
self-defense began to unravel.78  However, pro-democratic 
intervention rarely constitutes an autonomous justification for the 
use of force that would otherwise be illegal.  Practice shows that it 
is usually invoked to complement other arguments when 
circumstances leave great doubts as to the legality of the impugned 
action.  Be that as it may, similar to humanitarian intervention, it is 
hardly debatable that the concept has failed to garner enough 
 
conditions are met, a customary rule may emerge which would legitimize the use 
of force by a group of states in the absence of prior authorization by the Security 
Council.”). 
75 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 51 (3d ed., 
2008) (discussing civil wars and the use of force); CORTEN, supra note 50, at 792 
(discussing the use of force in contemporary international law). 
76 See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 102 (2007) (clarifying legal norms surrounding 
the responsibility to protect). 
77 See Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A 
Ten-Year Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 765, 816 (1993) (observing that legal norms 
were not altogether ignored in the decision to invade Grenada); RUSSELL 
CRANDALL, GUNBOAT DEMOCRACY: U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC, GRENADA, AND PANAMA 105–62 (2006) (discussing the invasion of 
Grenada). 
78 See, e.g., Statement of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 74 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 793–96 (2003). 
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support to constitute a new customary limitation to the prohibition 
on the use of force.79 
Even though they do not presently reflect customary 
international law, the concepts of humanitarian and pro-
democratic interventions are very symptomatic of just how 
unabashed some States may be when it comes to justifying a 
conduct whose illegality is so evident.  Moreover, despite their 
dramatic potential for abuse, it certainly cannot be excluded that 
these limitations to the prohibition on the use of force may 
someday gain enough currency to constitute positive law, thereby 
further unraveling the prohibition on the use of force. 
3.1.3. Military Counter-Measures 
States injured by a violation of their rights are entitled to react 
by infringing some obligations that they owe to the author of the 
wrongdoing.  This is what is commonly called, under the Law of 
State Responsibility, a “counter-measure.”80  It is well known that 
Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility prohibits military 
counter-measures, that is, reactions of injured States that could 
involve a violation of the prohibition on the use of force.  By 
carefully carving the substantive limits of the types of counter-
measures that may be utilized by injured States, the International 
Law Commission aimed to reflect the classical limits of the 
prohibition on the use of force.81 
Despite this clear legal framework, it is startling that the 
International Court of Justice as well as the Institut de Droit 
 
79 See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, L’ETAT NON DÉMOCRATIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
316–26 (Pedone 2008) (discussing non-democratic states in international law).  On 
the absence of a right to use force to restore democratic governance in the 
framework of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, see 
Marco Roscini, Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum, 
69 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 931, 
955-58 (2009). 
80 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 22 (addressing 
exhaustion of local remedies).  The term “counter-measures” was first coined by 
the International Arbitral Tribunal in the case of Air Service Agreement of 27 
March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 1978 R.I.A.A. XVIII, 417, 417 (Dec. 9). 
81 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 50 (discussing 
prohibited countermeasures); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES 288–89 (2002) (addressing Article 50 and obligations that are not 
affected by counter-measures). 
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international have both hinted at the possibility of taking counter-
measures involving the use of force even though they restrict their 
comments to narrowly defined situations.  For instance, in the 
Nicaragua case, the Court contended that “[i]t might however be 
suggested that, in such a situation, the United States might have 
been permitted to intervene in Nicaragua in the exercise of some 
right analogous to the right of collective self-defense, one which 
might be resorted to in a case of intervention short of armed 
attack.”82  Later, the Court stated that: 
[t]he acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming 
them to have been established and imputable to that State, 
could only have justified proportionate counter-measures 
on the part of the State which had been the victim of these 
acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica.  They 
could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State, 
the United States, and particularly could not justify 
intervention involving the use of force.83 
It is acknowledged that the hints the Court made at the possibility 
of resorting to forceful counter-measures are beset with ambiguity, 
and it would be an exaggeration to infer from them any clear 
conclusion.  However, the interpretation giving rise to the right to 
take military counter-measures in case of attacks of lesser intensity 
has also been endorsed by Judge Simma in his separate opinion to 
the decision of the Court in the Oil Platforms case, an opinion which 
is worth reproducing here: 
I am less satisfied with the argumentation used in the 
Judgment by which the Court arrives at the—correct—
conclusion that, since the Iranian mine, gunboat or 
helicopter attacks on United States shipping did not 
amount to an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 
51 of the Charter, the United States actions cannot be 
justified as recourse to self-defense under that provision.  
The text of paragraph 51 of the Judgment might create the 
impression that, if offensive military actions remain below 
the—considerably high—threshold of Article 51 of the 
 
82 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 
(June 27). 
83 Id. at 127. 
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Charter, the victim of such actions does not have the right 
to resort to—strictly proportionate—defensive measures 
equally of a military nature.  What the present Judgment 
follows at this point are some of the less fortunate 
statements in the Court’s Nicaragua Judgment of 1986.  In 
my view, the permissibility of strictly defensive military 
action taken against attacks of the type involving, for 
example, the Sea Isle City or the Samuel B. Roberts cannot be 
denied.  What we see in such instances is an unlawful use 
of force “short of’ an armed attack (“agression armée”) 
within the meaning of Article 51, as indeed “the most grave 
form of the use of force[.”]  Against such smaller-scale use 
of force, defensive action—by force also “short of’ Article 
51—is to be regarded as lawful.  In other words, I would 
suggest a distinction between (full-scale) self-defence 
within the meaning of Article 51 against an “armed attack” 
within the meaning of the same Charter provision on the 
one hand and, on the other, the case of hostile action, for 
instance against individual ships, below the level of Article 
51, justifying proportionate defensive measures on the part 
of the victim, equally short of the quality and quantity of 
action in self-defence expressly reserved in the United 
Nations Charter.  Here I see a certain analogy with the 
Nicaragua case, where the Court denied that the hostile 
activities undertaken by Nicaragua against El Salvador 
amounted to an “armed attack” within the meaning of 
Article 51, that would have given the United States a right 
to engage in collective self-defence, and instead qualified 
these activities as illegal military intervention.  What the 
Court did consider permissible against such unlawful acts 
were “proportionate counter-measures[,”] but only those 
resorted to by the immediate victim.84 
The Institut de Droit international alluded to that possibility as well.  
Indeed, in its 2007 Santiago Resolution on Present Problems of the 
Use of Armed Force in International Law, it indicated that: 
 
84 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 331–32 (Nov. 6) (separate 
opinion of Judge Simma). 
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An armed attack triggering the right of self-defense must be 
of a certain degree of gravity.  Acts involving the use of 
force of lesser intensity may give rise to countermeasures in 
conformity with international law.  In case of an attack of 
lesser intensity the target State may also take strictly 
necessary police measures to repel the attack.85 
Here is not the place to discuss whether resorting to defensive 
military measures would be an appropriate response for States 
which are victims of attacks not amounting to armed attacks.  It is 
more interesting to note that this veiled support for a new 
limitation to the prohibition on the use of force has not emanated 
from States but from judges and scholars.  Indeed, States have 
generally stuck to the discourse of self-defense, even when their 
action was not following the logic of self-defense.86 
It should be noted that the idea of military counter-measures 
certainly gives rise to fewer possibilities of abuse than 
humanitarian intervention and pro-democratic intervention.  It 
could also be argued that it is because of the lack of entitlement to 
take defensive military counter-measures that States have tried to 
disguise their defensive military measures as humanitarian 
intervention or pro-democratic intervention.  Nevertheless, the 
only relevance for this Article of these weighty pronouncements of 
the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) and the Institut de Droit 
international in favor of military counter-measures lies in their 
potential, despite their ambiguity, to further dilute the prohibition 
on the use of force. 
3.2. Loosening Existing Limitations? 
Under current international law, force is permitted if it has 
been authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII after a 
finding of the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach to the 
 
85 Institut de Droit International, Present Problems of the Use of Armed Force 
in International Law, Res. 10A (Oct. 27, 2007), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2007_san_02_en.pdf. 
86 See TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203–04 (2005) (distinguishing between armed reprisals and 
pre-emptive self-defense); GRAY, supra note 75, at 197–98 (stating that the self-
defense attacks by the U.S. and Israel may have been more than defensive); 
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 382 
(2009) (noting that offensive military attacks have been justified using self-
defense). 
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peace, or an act of aggression.  It is also allowed without prior 
authorization of the Council if a State has been the victim of an 
armed attack and it is necessary to repel the attack.  When they do 
not propose new limitations, States try to fit their behavior within 
the ambit of these two existing hypotheses by audaciously 
stretching their limits. 
3.2.1. Abusing Past Security Council Authorizations 
As was alluded to earlier, the Security Council, while clearly 
coming back to life after the end of the Cold War, has quickly 
returned to acting with great prudence and now proves reluctant 
to authorize the use of force preferring instead to authorize non-
forceful measures.  The Council’s aversion to the authorization to 
use force is not solely the result of the classical reluctance of veto-
wielding powers like the People’s Republic of China or the Russian 
Republic to give permission for multilateral uses of force.  The 
misgivings of these countries vis-à-vis the requests for 
authorization submitted by other member States can, in large part, 
be traced to the fallout caused by a few States’ abuse of 
authorizations of force granted by the Security Council in the early 
1990s.87  In particular, the multiple attempts—especially by the 
United States88 and the United Kingdom89—between 1991 and 2003 
 
87 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 
687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 
724, 727–28 (1998) (maintaining that such a practice is consistent with 
international law); Yoo, supra note 36, at 571–74 (discussing the justifications 
under international law for the use of force in Iraq).  Contra Franck, What Happens 
Now?, supra note 1, at 612–14 (arguing that international law does not provide 
justification for the U.S. and U.K. actions in Iraq); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, 
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and 
the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 150–52 (1999) (finding a lack of 
justification for the actions of the United States and United Kingdom in Iraq, and 
pointing to the Security Council’s rebuffs of those efforts); Stromseth, supra note 5, 
at 629–31 (discussing disagreements in the international community about the use 
of force in Iraq both in the 1990s and in 2003). 
88 See Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 611–12 (1970) (citing 
William H. Taft, Remarks Before National Association of Attorneys General (Mar. 
20, 2003)) (discussing the Department of State’s position on the presidential 
invocation of self-defense to justify the use of force); see also Letter from the 
Permanent Representative of the United States of America, Address to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003): 
It has been long recognized and understood that a material breach of 
these obligations removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the 
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to “revive” the authorization to use force contained in Resolution 
678 (1991) have convinced other States that future authorizations 
should be made more carefully.  Their hesitance also stems from 
the overly generous and unlimited authorizations issued by an 
overactive Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War. 
These abusive justifications, based on past authorizations, have 
ignited a vicious circle, which, in turn, has paved the way for a 
greater disentanglement of the collective security system.  Indeed, 
having witnessed abusive uses of its authorizations, the Council 
and its members have grown disinclined to authorize force.  As a 
result, States, confronted with a (self-inflicted) recurrent dismissal 
of their bellicose plans by the Security Council, have been prodded 
to take advantage of extinct authorizations already granted by the 
Security Council.  Simultaneously, these States have been 
emboldened to make abusive interpretations of the other exception 
under which the use of force is admitted, i.e. self-defense. 
3.2.2. Expanding Self-Defense 
It is mostly through a perversion of the self-defense limitation90 
that States have undermined the prohibition on the use of force.  
 
authority to use force under resolution 678 (1990). This has been the basis 
for coalition use of force in the past and has been accepted by the 
Council, as evidenced, for example, by the Secretary-General’s public 
announcement in January 1993 following Iraq’s material breach of 
resolution 687 (1991) that coalition forces had received a mandate from 
the Council to use force according to resolution 678 (1990). 
Id.; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 427 (2003) (detailing Iraq’s failure to 
comply with disarmament resolutions); Yoo, supra note 36, at 570 (“Thus, because 
Iraq refused to fully comply with Resolution 687, such as by destroying fully its 
[weapons of mass destruction] and their delivery systems, it was in ‘serious 
violation’ of the cease-fire and the United States was justified in resuming use of 
force under Resolution 678.”). 
89 See Lord Goldsmith, Address to Parliamentary Question, Attorney General 
Clarifies Legal Basis for Use of Force Against Iraq (18 March 2008) available at 
http://fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2003/03/fco_not_180303_legaladvice 
(referencing the Attorney General of the U.K.’s position on the use of force in 
Iraq); see also UK Materials on International Law, 64 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L., 736–40 
(1993). 
90 As was explained supra note 66, the I.C.J. abandoned its classical 
qualification of self-defense as an “exception” to the prohibition on the use of 
force in favor of regarding it as a “limitation.”  See generally Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) (discussing the court’s self-defense jurisprudence); 
d’Argent, supra note 66 (highlighting this transition). 
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Indeed, contemporary practice—especially practice pertaining to 
the fight against “terrorism”91—has caused far-ranging and 
sweeping abuses of the concept of self-defense as it is enshrined in 
Article 51 of the Charter.  The perversion of the self-defense 
limitation has manifested itself in various ways.  It has impinged 
on the notion of armed attack, the requirement that the aggression 
or the threat of aggression originates from a State and the 
requirement of a prior aggression.  A few words must be said 
about each of these emerging loopholes in the right of self-defense 
since they reflect a general widening of the limitation of the 
concept and, thus, an acceleration of the collective security 
system’s disintegration. 
3.2.2.1. The Threshold of Violence Required for an Armed 
Attack 
The definition of what constitutes an armed attack has long 
fueled controversy.  As is well-known, this debate has been partly 
kindled by the discrepancies existing between the English and 
French versions of the U.N. Charter.92  The definition provided by 
the General Assembly’s Resolution 3314 (XXIX)93 has not fully 
alleviated this concern—some authors even went as far as claiming 
that it consciously codifies all the judicial “loopholes and pretexts” 
to unleash aggression.94  While there is probably no controversy in 
cases of all-out invasion by regular armed forces of one State into 
the territory of another State, it remains uncertain whether an 
attack by precise modern airborne weapons or a series of low-scale 
attacks constitute armed attacks giving rise to the right to use force 
 
91 See The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (explaining 
that terrorism is understood as an activity “intended to cause death or serious 
bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a 
population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act”). 
92 Charte des Nations Unies [U.N. Charter] art. 51 (suggesting a higher 
threshold of violence for an  “agression armée”). 
93 See Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154 RECUEIL DES COURS 299, 
307–12 (1977) (providing a historical account of the elaboration of the definition of 
aggression). 
94 Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 224, 239 (1977) (arguing that states which joined in the consensus 
showed ample awareness of persisting conflicts). 
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in self-defense.  In recent years, the question of whether a cyber-
attack can be considered an armed attack has also been debated.95 
Mindful of the risk inherent in a loose understanding of the 
concept of armed attack, the position of the I.C.J. has been twofold.  
On the one hand, the court has always carefully avoided the most 
controversial of the abovementioned difficulties.  In the Oil 
Platforms case, for instance, the I.C.J. was confronted with the 
question of whether a series of minor attacks cumulatively 
amounted to an armed attack96—an argument, often called the 
accumulation doctrine, that has long been advocated by some 
States97—but failed to provide an answer.98  On the other hand, in 
the context of a foreign State’s support of insurgents, the court has 
provided a very restrictive interpretation of how the concept of 
armed attack must be understood.  In its 1998 decision, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua, for example, the court referred 
to the definition of “aggression” enshrined in the abovementioned 
resolution 3314 of the General Assembly and argued that it 
required a very high level of State involvement in an attack by 
irregular forces.99  In the Oil Platforms case, the court, by referring 
to the reference made by the court in the Nicaragua case to the 
gravity of the attack in the context of collective self-defense,100 
required the attack by regular forces to be of a certain gravity to 
amount to an armed attack triggering the right to self-defense.101  
 
95 See Mark Landler & John Markoff, In Estonia, What May Be the First War in 
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007 
/05/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-cyberwar.4.5901141.html (discussing “the 
first war in cyberspace”). 
96 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 190–91 (Nov. 6) (“[T]he burden 
of proof of the existence of an armed attack by Iran on the United States, in the 
form of a missile attack on the Sea Isle City, has not been discharged.”). 
97 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 230–31 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (explaining the accumulation doctrine advanced by 
Israel). 
98 See Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 331–32 (separate opinion of Judge Simma) 
(noting that the majority opinion did not address the issue of cumulative attacks 
which do not individually constitute armed attacks). 
99 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103–
04 (June 27) (“There is no rule in customary international law permitting another 
State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own 
assessment of the situation”); see also id. at 341–47 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the narrow understanding of aggression adopted by the court). 
100 Id. at 103. 
101 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 186–91 (stating that an exercise of self-defense 
requires verification that a state was responsible for the attack, and that the attack 
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This very strict understanding of what constitutes an armed attack 
was challenged by Uganda in its pleading in Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo but the court did not yield.102  The 
conservatism of the court has been widely criticized.103  It was, 
however, followed by other international judges, including the 
Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Award in Ethiopia’s Ius ad 
Bellum Claims 1-8,104 as well as the Institut de Droit international.105 
The conservatism of the court has probably not been useless.  It 
seems that in practice States still believe that self-defense can only 
be used as long as the original attack is of sufficient gravity.  
Gravity can nonetheless be understood in various ways as it can 
stem from either the scale of the attack or its effects; the I.C.J. itself 
resorted to both yardsticks in the Nicaragua case.106  This means 
that a lot of uncertainty remains as to how the gravity of the attack 
must be appraised.  Be that as it may, it is regrettable that the Court 
has not seized upon the opportunity to resolve the controversies 
pertaining to a series of low-intensity attacks or the use of specific 
 
fits into the definition of “armed attack” as specified in Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter). 
102 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 146–47 (Dec. 19) (holding that Uganda had no 
right to self-defense); see also Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 4–15 (separate 
opinion of Judge Simma) (suggesting that the narrow interpretation needs to be 
reevaluated); Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 16–31 (separate opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans) (criticizing the court for not seizing upon the opportunity to clarify 
that point). 
103 See generally Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the I.C.J.’s Procedural 
and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116 (1987) (arguing that recent I.C.J. 
decisions resulted in substantive and procedural disadvantages in dispute 
resolution). 
104 See Eth. v. Eri., Partial Award, 45 I.L.M. 430 (2006) (exhibiting a strict 
understanding of what an armed attack constitutes).  See generally Pierre d’Argent 
& Jean d’Aspremont, La Commission des réclamations Erythrée—Ethiopie: un premier 
bilan, 53 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 347 (2007) (supporting this 
stance further). 
105 See Institut de Droit international, Substitution and Equivalence in Private 
International Law, Res. 10A, art. 5 (Oct. 27, 2007) (“To an act requiring the 
intervention of an authority such as a judge, notary, or registrar, an equivalent act 
by the authority of another State is substituted if the respective authorities 
exercise the same or similar functions.”); Institut de Droit international, Present 
Problems of the Use of Armed Force in International Law, Res. 10A, para. 5 (Oct. 
27, 2007) (“An armed attack triggering the right of self-defence must be of a 
certain degree of gravity.”). 
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 
195 (June 27). 
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weapons, because these ambiguities could pave the way for large 
abuses of the concept of self-defense.  It must be acknowledged 
that these debates have remained limited in scope.  The expansion 
of self-defense to situations involving attacks by non-State actors—
while corresponding to a contemporary need—has been much 
more instrumental in the enfeeblement of the collective security 
system and therefore will be briefly addressed. 
3.2.2.2. Armed  Attacks by Non-State Actors 
It is probably the threats posed by non-State actors—those that 
are seen as belonging to terrorist organizations or secessionist 
movements—at the global, regional, or local level that have 
prodded States to incrementally feel less constrained by the legal 
requirements of the self-defense exception.  This is not entirely 
surprising.  In the absence of an authorization by the Security 
Council, the current collective security system does not provide an 
explicit right to use force in the case of an armed attack by non-
State actors,107 unless it can be attributed to a State—for instance, 
because it has been committed under the effective control of 
another State108—or simply because it follows “[t]he sending by or 
on behalf of [another] State of armed hands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force . . . of such 
gravity as to amount to [an act of aggression].”109  As a result, 
States, confronted with the rising threats from non-State actors, 
have tried to justify the use of armed force on the basis of self-
 
107 On the desire of some states during the negotiations on the U.N. General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression to construe mere support, assistance or 
encouragement to armed bands abroad as aggression, see Stone, supra note 94, at 
238 (describing how states such as Indonesia and Guyana wanted to expand the 
range of activities constituting aggression). 
108 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. para. 115 (“United States 
participation . . . in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping 
of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning 
of the whole of its operation, [was] still insufficient in itself . . . for the purpose of 
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of 
their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua”); Armed Activities, 2005 
I.C.J. para. 160 (concluding “the MLC was not that of ‘an organ’ of Uganda”); 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, para. 396 (Feb. 26) 
(determining whether the massacres at Srebrenica were committed by persons 
under control of the state). 
109 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
See also CORTEN, supra note 50, at 672 (discussing the use of force in contemporary 
international law). 
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defense even if the armed attack cannot be attributed to a State but 
only to a terrorist organization.  It is particularly noteworthy that, 
while unilateral uses of force against non-state actors in the 1980s 
were systematically condemned,110 this is no longer the case.  
Attention now focuses not on the question of whether the use of 
force is permitted, but instead on whether the use of force is 
proportionate.111  This is well-illustrated by the war in Afghanistan 
in 2001112 and the war in Lebanon in 2006.113  Overall, claims that 
force can be used as a measure of self-defense are no longer the 
exception and are closer to becoming the rule.114 
If the concept of armed attack is understood as being 
necessarily committed by a State, one can liken the rule of self-
defense to a rule that only yields its legal effects if the behavior that 
it regulates can be ascribed to a person endowed with an official 
status.115  This means that self-defense is a rule whereby the 
impugned conduct,116 or the fact which triggers the legal effects 
defined by the rule, must be the act of an actor or an entity which 
 
110 See S.C. Res. 573, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (condemning 
the 1985 raid by Israel on the PLO Headquarters outside Tunis); G.A. Res. 41/38, 
para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986) (condemning the raid of the 
United States against Libya). 
111 Tams, supra note 86, at 379. 
112 See generally GREGOR WETTBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OF SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS: STATE PRACTICE FROM THE U.N. CHARTER TO 
THE PRESENT 152–63 (2007) (discussing the conflict in Afghanistan).  See also 
Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors in 
the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183, 206–08 
(2010) (discussing the application of the self-defense limitation to the Afghanistan 
conflict). 
113 See generally Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello and the Issue of Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 99 
(2007) (discussing the Second Lebanon War in relation to the use of force under 
international law and to international humanitarian law). 
114 Cf. Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 608 (explaining that, while 
in the 1970s states tried to justify use of force with self-defense, today states rarely 
put much effort into a self-defense justification). 
115 Note, for instance, the obligations pertaining to the right to life, which 
requires that a state agent commit an infringement of the right to life.  See generally 
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 155 (2nd ed., 2004) (arguing that the 
state must control and limit circumstances in which individuals may be deprived 
of life by the state). 
116 On the discussion of whether self-defense enshrines a right or a 
prohibition, see Kammerhofer, supra note 14, at 229 (discussing the use of force 
within Kelsen’s theoretical framework). 
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has the official status of a State.  It cannot be ascertained whether 
this was the original meaning of the concept of armed attack when 
it was first set out in the U.N. Charter.  Indeed, the question of 
what constitutes an armed attack was not really deemed important 
during the negotiations of the Charter, as Article 51 was originally 
devised to ensure compatibility between regional self-defense 
pacts and the U.N. collective security system.117  At that time, 
violence in the international arena was still mostly construed in a 
classical inter-State format.  Even if we believe that the concept of 
self-defense was originally restricted to situations of armed attacks 
by States, it is still conceivable that the rule has evolved to waive 
the requirement pertaining to the official status of the original 
attacker and now encapsulates situations of attack by non-State 
actors. 
Since there is no clear answer in the Charter, one might have 
expected the I.C.J., in its role as “principal judicial organ” of the 
U.N.,118 to alleviate this pressing need for clarification.  Such a 
move would, after all, be in line with its previous crucial 
contributions to the clarification of the U.N. system.119  Overall, the 
I.C.J. in its Nicaragua,120 Wall,121 and Armed Activities122 decisions 
promoted a very orthodox understanding of the classical rule of 
self-defense and has tended to shy away from clearly affirming a 
right to resort to self-defense in cases of armed attack by non-State 
actors.  In the Nicaragua and Armed Activities cases, the court did 
not expressly rule out the application of self-defense in cases of 
armed attack by non-State actors, for it was not necessary to 
 
117 Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, Pre-
emption, Prevention, and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN, 113, 116–17, 
121 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
118 U.N. Charter art. 92. 
119 One of the most crucial clarifications to the U.N. system was formulated 
by the I.C.J..  See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 65 (June 21) (determining 
that since South Africa’s mandate in South West Africa was terminated, its 
presence there was illegal). 
120 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 
195 (June 27). 
121 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 139 (July 9). 
122 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 148 (Dec. 19). 
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envisage self-defense from that angle.123  Its advisory opinion in 
Wall is more intricate in this respect.  Although the court did not 
expressly say that the right to self-defense exists only in the case of 
an armed attack by one State against another,124 the decision can 
reasonably be interpreted as an implicit rejection of the right to use 
force against the territory of another State (or quasi-State entity) in 
response to acts of non-State actors emanating from the territory 
but not attributable to that (quasi-)State entity.  The separate 
opinions of the judges joined to the advisory opinion seem to 
confirm this interpretation.125  The implicit rejection126 of the 
application of self-defense in cases of attacks of great gravity by 
non-State actors has been significantly criticized by scholars for 
being overly conservative and oblivious to contemporary 
realities.127 
It is beyond doubt that the court is well aware of the current 
controversies riddling the concept of self-defense and the 
ambiguity of its decisions is not a pure fortuity.  Although the 
court’s decisions are predominantly conservative, the uncertainty 
shrouding the pronouncements prevent us from inferring firm 
 
123 See Kimberley Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right 
of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 144 
(2007) (“As in Nicaragua, the court did not explicitly rule out that a lesser degree of 
State involvement (such as acquiescence) could form the basis for attributing the 
armed activities of irregular forces to the State”). 
124 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. para. 139. 
125 This seems to be confirmed by the separate opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, 2005 I.C.J. para. 35, as well as by the 
separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall, 2005 I.C.J. para. 6. 
126 For an interpretation of the decision as not excluding self-defense in case 
of attacks by non-state actors, see Iris Canor, When Jus ad Bellum meets Jus in 
Bello: The Occupier’s Right of Self-Defence Against Terrorism Stemming from Occupied 
Territories, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 129, 132 (2006) (arguing that, although the I.C.J. 
gives “thin treatment” to self-defense, the concept is related to the legal 
personality of the state and state responsibility and effective control). 
127 See Christian Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-
Defence in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963 (2005) for the argument that in 
interpreting self-defense that way, it would become a “vehicle that hardly ever 
leaves the garage.”  He borrows this expression from Ian Brownlie, Comment, in 
CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW–MAKING 110 (Joseph H. H. Weiler 
& Antonio Cassese eds., 1988) (referring to jus cogens); see also Sean D. Murphy, 
Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the I.C.J.?, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 62 (2005) (criticizing the I.C.J.’s “institutional capabilities” to 
adjudicate cases of armed conflict). 
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conclusions regarding the application of the concept of self-
defense, particularly since the court did not entirely rule out the 
application of self-defense in the case of an armed attack by non-
State actors. 
So long as the Charter and the court’s case law do not clearly 
exclude the application of self-defense in cases of attack by non-
State actors and seemingly leaves room for further development of 
the rule, the conceptual routes by which the concept of self-defense 
can accommodate the contemporary State practice of armed force 
used against non-State entities remains unclear.  Recent 
scholarship seems to have envisaged the extension of self-defense 
to situations of attack by non-State actors in two different ways.  
First, some authors have suggested that the rules of attribution 
ought to be either different or loosely interpreted in cases of attack 
by non-State actors (special rules of attribution).  Second, some 
authors have argued that the concept of armed attack no longer 
requires that the attack be attributed to any State.  Those defending 
the latter option have either discarded any requirement of state 
involvement (privatization of the concept of armed attack) or have 
posited that the original attack, although not attributable to a State, 
still requires some State involvement (indirect attack).  These 
different conceptual options deserve some attention. 
3.2.2.2.1.  Special Rules of Attribution 
This is the idea—already articulated in Judge Jennings’ 
dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case128—that there exists a 
radically different, special rule (lex specialis) of conduct attribution 
that departs from the traditional rules of attribution enshrined in 
the Articles of the International Law Commission on State 
Responsibility in cases of armed attacks by terrorist groups.129  The 
 
128 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 533 
(June 27), Jennings, J., dissenting. 
129 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51 arts. 4–11 (defining state 
acts).  This has barely been discussed in the international legal scholarship.  But see 
André Nollkaemper, Attribution of Forcible Acts to States: Connections between the 
Law on the Use of Force and the Law of State Responsibility, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
AND THE USE OF FORCE 133, 162 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005) 
(“Responsibility of a state based on knowledge, foreseeability, intent, and 
causation may come close to attribution for purposes of state responsibility.”).  See 
also Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors 
in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, supra note 112 at 194–97 
(discussing “state attribution rules”). 
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possibility of special rules of attribution that depart from the 
general rules laid out by the ILC has also been recognized by the 
I.C.J. itself in the Genocide case; though the Court required that 
these rules be “clearly expressed.”130  Adapting the rules of 
attribution to cases of armed attacks by terrorists groups could also 
take the form, not of a lex specialis, but of a very flexible and loose 
interpretation of the principles of attribution enshrined in Articles 
4–11 of the Articles on State Responsibility.131 
It is important to note that adapting the rules of attribution to 
some special hypotheses—whether through new special rules or ad 
hoc interpretation—dovetails with a classical “inter-state” 
interpretation of the concept of armed attack, and more generally 
an inter-state reading of ius ad bellum.132  It is also a conceptual 
construction that preserves the fulfillments of the other conditions 
of the exercise of self-defense, and especially the condition of 
necessity.  Indeed, in the mainstream interpretation of the 
conditions for the exercise of self-defense, the condition of 
necessity includes a requirement of state involvement.133  This 
means that the involvement of a state is required to ensure that the 
military response fulfills the condition of necessity.  In other 
words, if the defensive attack is directed at a state, the original 
attack must have been committed by a state due to strict necessity.  
In light of this requirement, it is only if the armed attack by non-
State actors can be formally attributed to a state that the condition 
 
130 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, para. 401 (Feb. 
26) (“The rules for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State 
do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question in the absence of a 
clearly expressed lex specialis.”). 
131 See, e.g., Tams, supra note 86, at 385–87 (discussing the various ways to 
construct attribution and state responsibility); see also Nollkaemper, supra note 
129, at 156–157 (discussing the attribution of acts of force to the state). 
132 This is also the opinion of Tams, supra note 86, at 369. 
133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 209–10 (discussing that the predicate 
requirements for self-defense include necessity, proportionality, and immediacy); 
Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as ‘Armed Attack’: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51 
(1/2) of the UN Charter and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 
42, 47–48 (2003) (evaluating when a state can use self-defense against terrorist 
aggression); Trapp, supra note 123, at 145–46 (“decisions [of the International 
Court] should be understood as requiring that armed attacks be attributable to a 
State if the State itself is to be the subject of defensive uses of force.”) (emphasis in 
original); see also Raphaël van Steenberghe, supra note 112, at 199 (discussing the 
use of force against private armed attacks). 
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of necessity can be fulfilled.  However, it should be noted that 
while severing the concept of armed attack from attribution to a 
state may help extend situations of armed attack to violence by 
irregular forces, it would nonetheless prove of little value with 
respect to the requirement of necessity. 
While the adaptation of the rules of attribution may seem more 
attuned to the inter-state character of the international legal order 
and the condition of necessity, it may be more problematic as a 
matter of policy and pragmatism.  As has been argued by 
Milanovic, there is a strong policy argument in favor of an 
amendment of the primary rules pertaining to the use of force 
instead of the secondary rules of attribution.134  According to that 
view, contemporary problems are better dealt with if primary rules 
are changed without affecting the general systemic rules.  This 
Article does not intend to address this debate.  The following 
paragraphs simply present the two manners in which the primary 
rules pertaining to the use of force, rather than the secondary rules 
of attribution, can be modified to accommodate a use of force 
against non-State actors without affecting the secondary rules of 
attribution. 
3.2.2.2.2. Privatization of the Concept of Armed Attack 
Although the conditions for the exercise of self-defense seem to 
require that the armed attack be committed by a state entity, some 
authors have defended another conceptual construction to justify 
the extension of self-defense to situations of armed attack by non-
state entities.  According to them, the concept of armed attack does 
not require the attack to emanate from a state; instead, the 
determination of what constitutes an armed attack is strictly a 
question of the intensity of the attack.135  Such an interpretation—
 
134 See Marko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Acts of Non-state Actors: A 
Comment on Griebel and Plücken, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 307, 323 (2009) (discussing the 
adoption of permanent rules). 
135 See Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Response to Terrorism, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
ROBERT AGO, 139, 146 (P. L. Zanardi et al eds., 1987) (explaining that even if a state 
is too weak to evict terrorists from its borders, the victim state need not sit by and 
allow the attacks solely out of respect for a sovereign’s borders); DINSTEIN, supra 
note 97, at 206–08; Daniel Janse, International Terrorism and Self-Defence, 36 ISRAEL 
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 149, 170–71 (2006) (arguing that the self-defense justification could 
seemingly be used against a state supporting terrorists); Murphy, supra note 127, 
at 63 (discussing the scope of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter); Sean D. Murphy, 
Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 
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which completely privatizes the concept of armed attack—has also 
been echoed in some I.C.J. Judges’ opinions.136  It is not impossible 
that an additional underpinning for this construction may be 
found in the position advocated by the Court in the Oil Platforms 
case where the Court severed the question of attribution of the 
attack to a state from the determination of the armed attack itself.137 
Should the concept of armed attack be entirely stripped of its 
inter-state features, this re-reading of Article 51 would probably go 
hand-in-hand with an acceptance of the so-called ‘accumulation 
doctrine’ whereby a string of small-scale attacks by non-state actors 
amount to an armed attack falling under Article 51.  The I.C.J. has 
shown that it is not ready to accept this concept.138  It is uncertain 
whether this would still be its position if the idea of a private 
armed attack were to be widely accepted. 
3.2.2.2.3.  Indirect Attack 
Among those who have advocated a concept of armed attack 
stripped of any requirement of attribution to the state, some have 
nonetheless continued to require a certain level of state 
involvement in the original attack committed by non-state actors.  
 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2002) (explaining the scale of activities that might rise to 
the level of an armed attack); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the 
Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 
16–18 (2003) (discussing the use of anticipatory self-defense in the context of 
threats from terrorists after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks). 
136 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 35 (July 9) (separate 
opinion of Judge Kooijmans); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 11 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion 
of Judge Simma). 
137 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 51 (Nov. 6).  Therefore, in 
order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in 
exercise of the right of individual self-defense, the United States had to show that 
attacks had been made upon it for which Iran was responsible; and that those 
attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” within the 
meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and as understood in 
customary law on the use of force.  For an understanding of this decision as 
allowing an application of self-defense even if the armed attack is not attributable 
to a State, see Trapp, supra note 123, at 156 (“In the meantime, State practice 
strongly suggests that the international community has recognized a right to use 
force in self-defence targeting non-State actors in foreign territory to the extent 
that the foreign State cannot be relied on to prevent or suppress terrorist 
activities.”). 
138 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. paras. 62–64. 
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Such state involvement, although of a lesser degree than that 
leading to attribution of the act or the state, could amount to 
toleration, acquiescence, logistical support, or assistance to the 
non-state entities carrying out the attack.139  This means that the 
armed attack is carried out by a non-state entity that was tolerated, 
harbored or supported by the state against which the defensive 
attack will subsequently be carried out.  This mild privatization of 
the concept of armed attack seems sufficient to live up to the 
condition of exercise of self-defense pertaining to necessity.  The 
extension of self-defense to situations of indirect attacks—namely 
cases of harboring terrorists or supporting them—has received an 
implied espousal in the 2005 African Union Non-Aggression and 
Common Defence Pact.140 
The exact conceptual foundation of the extension of the concept 
of self-defense to situations of armed attacks by non-state actors is 
still a matter of much debate.  Whether one amends or loosens the 
classical rules on attribution or whether one uses a strict severance 
between attribution to a state and the concept of armed attack so as 
to require no state involvement at all or only a limited state 
connection, the legal scholarship seems to be moving towards an 
acceptance of self-defense even if the armed attack cannot be 
 
139 See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 565–67 (1999) (discussing the involvement of Afghanistan 
and Sudan in providing “safe havens” for terrorist groups); Tom Ruys & Sten 
Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 J. CONFLICT & 
SEC. L. 289, 312 (2005) (arguing that the need for state involvement in private 
attacks is supported by both legal scholarship and state practice). 
140 Art. 1(c)(xi) states: 
The following shall constitute acts of aggression, regardless of a 
declaration of war by a State, group of States, organization of States, or 
non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity: . . . the encouragement, 
support, harbouring or provision of any assistance for the commission of 
terrorist acts and other violent trans-national organized crimes against a 
Member State. 
African Union, Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact art. 1(c)(xi), Jan. 31, 
2005, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Non% 
20Aggression%20Common%20Defence%20Pact.pdf.  On the relationship between 
the African Union Defence Pact and the U.N. Charter, see van Steenberghe, supra 
note 52, at 125.  On the specificities of the African Union Non-Aggression and 
Common Defense Pact, see Marco Roscini, Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great 
Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum, 69 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 931 (2009). 
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attributed to the state against which the defensive action is carried 
out.141 
3.2.2.3.  Pre-Emptive Self-Defense 
Another manifestation of the expansion of self-defense is the 
growing adoption among states of the concept of pre-emptive self-
defense.  While clearly prohibited by the U.N. Charter,142 pre-
emptive self-defense—in the case of an imminent threat of an 
armed attack143—has been gradually accepted by states.  The High 
Level Panel has also endorsed it, though in somewhat ambiguous 
terms.144  In addition, the Secretary-General espoused the idea that 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter covers imminent threats.145  Such a 
position is also defended by the Institut de Droit International.146 
 
141 This is also the opinion expressed in GRAY, supra note 75, at 130.  See the 
ambiguous resolution of paragraph 10 of the Institut de Droit International’s 
October 27, 2007 resolution, which recognizes the application of Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter to this situation but seems to restrict it to very limited and classical 
situations.  Problèmes actuels du recours à la force en droit international, Institut 
de Droit International, Res. 10A, para. 10 (Oct. 27, 2007). 
142 See CORTEN, supra note 50, at 619 (discussing the requirement in Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter that self-defense measures be preceded by an armed attack, 
such that pre-emptive self-defense is prohibited); Theodore Christakis, Vers une 
Reconnaissance de la Notion de Guerre Préventive?, in L’INTERVENTION EN IRAK ET LE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 19 (Karrine Bannelier et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter prohibits pre-emptive self-defense in its requirement of an 
armed attack). 
143 On preemptive self-defense, see generally W. Michael Reisman & Andrea 
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 525 (2006) (discussing the development of the use of pre-emptive self-
defense, where States react to the possibility of a future attack); Sean D. Murphy, 
The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005) (discussing the 
notion of pre-emptive self-defense in terms of international legal norms and legal 
theory); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 227 (2003) (evaluating the potential expansion of the legal definition of 
“armed attack” to include threats that prompt pre-emptive self-defense). 
144 U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES 
AND CHANGES, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY paras. 188–92, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/565, U.N. Sales. No. E.05.I.5 (2004). 
145 The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All, paras. 122–25, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
146 See Resolution of the Institut de Droit international Res. 10A, supra note 
141, para. 3 (“The right of self-defence arises for the target State in case of an 
actual or manifestly imminent armed attack.”). 
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It is important to highlight that this dismissal of the 
requirement that an armed attack has actually occurred does not 
go so far as permitting preventive self-defense, i.e. short of the 
imminent threat of an armed attack.147  Only a few states support 
the legality of preventive self-defense without even claiming that 
such an interpretation would constitute lex lata.148 
In any case, whether self-defense can be pre-emptive or even 
preventive, resorting to the conditions of exercise laid out in the 
famous Caroline incident149—which are frequent both in practice150 
and in the literature151—is hardly relevant.  The Caroline incident 
cannot serve as a precedent for any of the contemporary 
developments, at least as long as the collective security system still 
rests on a prohibition on the use of force.  The Caroline incident 
dates back to a time when the use of force was not prohibited.  It is, 
 
147 See U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, 
CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 144, paras. 189–92 (clarifying that it is 
illegal for a State to use force in response to a non-imminent threat absent Security 
Council authorization).  For comments from U.N. member states on the use of 
force, see the April 6–8, 2005 General Assembly debates.  U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.85 (Apr. 6, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.86 (Apr. 6, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.87 (Apr. 7, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.88 (Apr. 7, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
89th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.89 (Apr. 8, 2005); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
90th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.90 (Apr. 8, 2005).  See also Institut de Droit 
International Res. 10A, supra note 141, para. 6 (“There is no basis in international 
law for the doctrine[] of ‘preventive’ self-defence . . .”). 
148 See Press Release from The White House, supra note 44 (stating the United 
States’ policy of taking action against emerging threats to its national security); 
Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing the United States’ 
National Security Strategy and suggesting that it appears to “be exponentially 
expanding . . . the range of permissible preemption.”).  On the ambiguous 
position of Australia, see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Pre-emptive Self-Defence: A 
Necessary Development or the Road to International Anarchy?, 23 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
51 (2004) (referring to statements by members of the Australian government 
proposing that the international community redefine the right of self-defense).  
See also Nicole Abadee & Donald R. Rothwell, The Howard Doctrine: Australia and 
Anticipatory Self-Defense against Terrorist Attacks, 26 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 19 (2007). 
149 For a review of the Caroline incident, see R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and 
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938) (discussing the Caroline case and its 
significance in the early development of legal limits to the right of self-defense). 
150 See William H. Taft, The Legal Basis for Preemption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, Nov. 18, 2002, http://www.cfr.org/publication/5250/legal_basis_for 
_preemption.html (discussing the Caroline “necessity” justification as it applies to 
the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction). 
151 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 36, at 572 (discussing the requirements of 
anticipatory self-defense as formulated in Caroline). 
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therefore, of no avail to invoke the practice of an era where the use 
of force was not prohibited152 in order to determine the ambit of a 
limitation to the prohibition to use force in the contemporary 
system.153 
3.3. Intervention by Invitation: Consent by Governments Lacking 
“Effectivité” 
Despite the stance defended by the Institut de Droit International 
opposing all interventions of third party states in civil war,154 it is 
well-known that the I.C.J. has confirmed in the case of the Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua that a state can call upon 
another state to assist it and consent to the use of force by the latter 
on its territory.155  The possibility of inviting another state to use 
force on one’s own territory—which is often done in practice156—
was again confirmed in the Armed Activities case.157  This is not, 
strictly speaking, a limitation to the prohibition on the use of force 
in the same vein as self-defense, for the prohibition on the use of 
force only prohibits the use of force without consent.158  Indeed, 
 
152 On the existence of the prohibition to use force to the U.N. Charter, see 
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 530 (June 27) 
(Jennings, J., dissenting) (“There is no doubt that there was, prior to the United 
Nations Charter, a customary law which restricted the lawful use of force, and 
which correspondingly provided also for a right to use force in self-defence.”). 
153 See Tarcisio Gazzini, A Response to Amos Guiora: Pre-Emptive Self-Defence 
Against Non-State Actors?, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 25, 25–26 (2008) (arguing that 
the Caroline incident should today be better treated under the “rubric of state 
necessity”). 
154 The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, Institut de Droit 
international Res. (Aug. 14, 1975), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf 
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. para. 246. 
156 On the recent practice concerning the Saudi military intervention in 
Yemen in November 2009, see Robert F. Worth, Yemeni Rebels and Saudis Clash at 
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2009, at A8 (reporting on Saudi Arabia’s involvement 
in the Yemeni government’s conflict with the rebels); Robert F. Worth, Saudis 
Claim to Beat Back Yemeni Rebels in Border Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at A7 
(describing the intervention as Saudi Arabia’s first “unilateral” military campaign 
in decades); Robert F. Worth, Yemen Rebels Routed, Saudi Arabia Says,  N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2009, at A14 (discussing Saudi military action against Yemeni rebels). 
157 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 42–54 & 92–105 (Dec. 19). 
158 Strangely enough, the International Law Commission has construed 
consent as a “circumstance precluding wrongfulness.”  Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 20. 
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once the host state consents, the use of force is not at odds with the 
territorial integrity of the host State and accordingly does not 
infringe Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
While this rule has not, at least as far as its principle is 
concerned, been subject to much controversy,159 the determination 
of the conditions upon which a government can issue such an 
invitation has allowed an enlargement of the consent-based 
justifications for the use of force.  Indeed, it has classically been 
contended that only an effective government could validly consent 
to the use of force by another State on its territory.  The growing 
importance of criteria for democratic legitimacy in international 
law160 has, however, diluted the requirement of effectivité of the 
government issuing the invitation.  The democratic legitimacy of a 
government has typically offset its poor effectivité.161  This indicates 
that the effectivité of the government issuing the invitation no 
longer constitutes the overarching condition of the validity of the 
consent to the intervention of another state.  This conclusion seems 
implied by the I.C.J. in its decision in the Armed Activities case, 
which never questioned whether the Congolese government was 
effective enough to validly invite other States to use force on its 
territory.162  The foregoing explains why democratic governments, 
which do not wield an effective control over the territory of the 
state, seem to be entitled to validly invite another state to forcefully 
intervene.  However, as illustrated by the American intervention in 
Grenada163 and in Panama,164 democratic legitimacy can be subject 
to manipulations and abusive interpretation; the possession of 
 
159 See GRAY, supra note 75, at 81 (observing that the rule represents a 
“generally agreed position” that “normally if one state requested assistance from 
another, then clearly that intervention could not be dictatorial and therefore 
unlawful.”). 
160 See Jean d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 877, 913-16 (2006) (discussing the criteria for determining 
the legitimacy of democratic governments and proposing a formulation that 
addresses the case of the illiberal democracy). 
161 Id. 
162 Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. paras. 42–54 & 92–105. 
163 See generally Crandall, supra note 77 (discussing the American intervention 
in Grenada). 
164 See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law: Protection of Nationals, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 200, 200 (1984) 
(discussing U.S. rescue operations in Grenada); Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Refugees, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 
655, 661 (1984) (discussing the collective security action in Grenada). 
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certain democratic trappings sometimes seems to suffice to endow 
an ineffective government with the power to invite a foreign State 
to intervene.  In this way, easing the requirements for validly 
consenting to the forceful intervention of another State further 
waters down the general prohibition on the use of force and 
weakens the collective security system. 
3.4. Evading Responsibility by Using Force Out of Necessity 
It is uncontested that, even though an action may constitute a 
violation of international law, its author will not incur 
responsibility if it can invoke any “circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness,”165 especially if it can prove that it acted in a state of 
necessity.166  This requires that the illegal conduct constituted the 
“only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril” and did not “seriously impair an 
essential interest of the state or states towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole.”167  No one 
disputes, however, that circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
cannot be invoked to absolve a state that has committed a violation 
of a peremptory norm of international law.168  This means that if 
the prohibition on the use force were to be considered a 
peremptory norm of international law, an illegal use of force 
 
165 It is interesting—although hardly understandable—that self-defense has 
been construed as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness by the International 
Law Commission in the framework of its work on the Responsibility of States.  
This seems to contradict the earlier position of the ILC, Addendum to the Eighth 
Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5 (1980), reprinted in 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n. 51, §83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1, as well as 
the understanding of the International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat of 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 38.  The 
commentary to Article 21 is itself beset by ambiguity.  See CRAWFORD, supra note 
81, at 166–67 (qualifying the legality of self-defense by stating that a State is 
“‘totally restrained’ by an international obligation if that obligation is expressly or 
intended to apply as a definitive constraint,” and also noting that “Article 21 
leaves open all issues of the effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.”). 
166 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 25. On the status of 
article 25, see the remarks of Sarah Heathcote, Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility—Necessity, in THE LAW OF 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, (J. Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (forthcoming) (on file with the 
author).  See also S. Heathcote, Est-ce que l’état de nécessité est un principe de droit 
international coutumier?, 40 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 53 (2007). 
167 Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 51, art. 25. 
168 Id. art. 26. 
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would always engage the responsibility of its author.  On the 
contrary, if the ius  cogens character of the norm lies solely with the 
prohibition of aggression, states using force beneath the threshold 
of aggression can evade responsibility by invoking a state of 
necessity. 
It must be acknowledged that this debate is rarely echoed in 
practice or in the discourse of states and has mostly been confined 
to academic circles.  This should not cause any surprise.  As has 
been stated, the main implications of this debate do not pertain to 
the legality of the impugned behavior but to its consequences in 
terms of responsibility to which states are less amenable.  It is 
nonetheless interesting to note that the I.C.J. deemed it important 
to examine the invocation of the state of necessity in its advisory 
opinion on the Wall Opinion.  It is of particular interest to note that 
the court examined the application of the state of necessity without 
preliminarily raising the question of the general applicability of 
such a rule in cases of violations that could include infringements of 
the prohibition on the use of force.169  The court remained 
ambiguous and it cannot be firmly asserted that the court 
presupposed that the state of necessity could be invoked to deprive 
low-intensity illegal uses of force of their wrongful character. 
For the sake of this study, there is no need to dwell upon that 
controversy and it suffices to note that, as some authors have 
argued,170 the Charter itself seems to prohibit the invocation of the 
state of necessity to evade responsibility for breaches of the 
Charter.  Although the U.N. Charter does not deal with issues of 
responsibility and is only concerned with questions of legality, it 
can reasonably be defended that the primary norms enshrined in 
the Charter have excluded the use of the secondary norm of 
necessity. In particular, by virtue of the concept of self-defense, the 
Charter seems to have intended to provide a self-contained regime 
as to how circumstances arising out of necessity could be used to 
evade compliance with the prohibition on the use force. 
 
169 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 140 (July 9). 
170 See, e.g., CORTEN, supra note 50, at 327 (arguing that the U.N. Charter does 
not provide for the invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, 
including a state of necessity); see also Maria Agius, The Invocation of Necessity in 
International Law, 56 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 95 (2009), at 111 (discussing the law of 
necessity under the U.N. Charter). 
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It must be acknowledged that this abovementioned restrictive 
interpretation of the Charter remains contentious, and it cannot be 
excluded that its silence on this matter, especially if conjugated 
with the idea that only the prohibition of aggression is endowed 
with ius cogens character, allows an interpretation of the concept of 
“state of necessity” that can potentially provide a new avenue for 
using force without bearing the consequences of responsibility. 
Should that be the case, not incurring responsibility would 
nonetheless continue to hinge on the respect for the strict 
conditions of the state of necessity, which may prove difficult in 
practice.171 
4.  APPRAISING THE DILUTION OF THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF 
FORCE 
This Article has so far tried to shed some light on the attempts 
by States to subvert the limitations on the prohibition on the use of 
force.  It has been argued here that this practice, although 
indicating some alarming instances of abuse, does not yet amount 
to a complete disappearance of the prohibition on the use of force.  
However, the dilution of the prohibition that has been evidenced 
by this practice may well usher in an era where force will no longer 
be prohibited.  As has been stated, it is not that states are shedding 
the prohibition.  It is, rather, that the prohibition is being diluted 
by the floating of new limitations and the expansion of the existing 
ones. 
As a result, we are left with a prohibition that is subject to 
numerous ill-defined qualifications that make it very difficult to 
delineate the exact command or restriction that it contains.  Indeed, 
the content of the rule has become extremely hazy since its scope 
has grown very uncertain.  The dilution of the prohibition on the 
use of force is of such magnitude that the rule is almost non-
normative.  By non-normative, this Article means that the rule no 
longer enshrines a clear command and barely lays down any 
specific obligation.  This is what I have called elsewhere a rule with 
a soft instrumentum,172 or what others have called a rule with a soft 
 
171 On the application of the conditions of the state of necessity to the use of 
force, see Christakis, supra note 142, at 29–45 (discussing the stringent application 
of the requirements for establishing a state of necessity). 
172 See Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for 
New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1081 (2008) (“The softness of the 
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formulation.173  In this sense, it can be argued that the prohibition on 
the use of force is becoming qualified by so many limitations, 
which are themselves unclear, that the rule itself is incrementally 
reaching a state of softness.  This does not mean that the 
prohibition on the use of force no longer constitutes a legal rule 
and has been demoted to a mere moral principle.  Indeed, the 
formulation of clear obligations is not a constitutive element of any 
legal norm.  Even if some scholars have argued to the contrary,174 it 
is now commonly agreed that a legal act need not be normative to 
be legal.175  A legal norm with a soft content also constitutes an 
entirely valid legal rule, for the formulation of a clear command is 
not a condition of its validity.176  There are strong indications that 
 
instrumentum pertains to the choice made by the legal subjects of an instrument 
which lies outside the realm of law.”).  Baxter is probably the first author to have 
interpreted soft law in this sense.  See R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite 
Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 549, 549 (1980) (“[T]here are norms of various 
degrees of cogency, persuasiveness, and consensus which are incorporated in 
agreements between States but do not create enforceable rights and duties.  They 
may be described as ‘soft’ law”); see also Georges M. Abi-Saab, Eloge du “Droit 
Assourdi”: Quelques Réflexions  sur le Rôle de la Soft Law en Droit International 
Contemporain, in NOUVEAUX ITINÉRAIRES EN DROIT: HOMAGE À FRANÇOIS RIGAUX 59, 
61 (1993) (examining the critique that soft law, increases the uncertainty 
associated with law by blurring the distinction between what is law and what is 
not); Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 
INTL & COMP. L.Q. 901, 901 (1999) (outlining the basic tenets of soft law); Tadeusz 
Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law,” 30 MCGILL L.J. 37, 
39 (1984) (characterizing soft law as a collection of techniques designed to 
“achieve the goals of collective action and limited constraint”); Hartmut 
Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 500 (1999) 
(differentiating among non-treaty agreements).  More recently, see ALAN BOYLE & 
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2007) (discussing contrast between rules and norms or principles).  But see VAUGN 
LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (rejecting the use of soft 
law to refer to legal acts with a soft content). 
173 BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 172, at 220. 
174 Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 34, 48 (July 6) (separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (“An instrument in which a party is entitled to 
determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable legal 
instrument of which a court of law can take cognizance.  It is not a legal 
instrument.  It is a declaration of a political principle and purpose.”); see also 
Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 116 (Mar. 21) (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Lauterpacht) (distinguishing the case at hand from Certain Norwegian 
Loans). 
175 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d) May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that, in lodging a reservation, States can “modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”). 
176 This is not in dispute, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
does not elevate the normative character of a conventional act into a condition of 
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the prohibition on the use of force is gradually experiencing a 
softening of its content, thereby bearing a closer resemblance to the 
prohibition on the threats of a use of force, which has always 
suffered from a clear lack of normativity.177 
On one occasion, the I.C.J. has been called upon to grapple with 
a rule that was deemed non-normative in this sense because it was 
riddled with too large a limitation.  In the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case, the court assessed the customary character of the 
equidistance principle enshrined in Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf.  On this occasion, it asserted 
that the norm at stake had first to “be of a fundamentally norm-
creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis 
of a general rule of law.”178  The court built on the idea that any 
conventional rule must contain a directive for it to be able to 
someday crystallize into a customary international rule.  Taking 
into account the profound indeterminacy of the concept of “special 
circumstances,” which determines the qualification of the 
equidistance principle, the court concluded that the principle of 
equidistance enshrined in the 1958 Convention was non-
normative.  Since the principle of equidistance did not provide for 
a given behavior to be adopted by the parties, the court concluded 
that it could not crystallize or generate a rule of customary 
international law.179 
 
its validity.  See id. pt. V, § 1 (1969) (discussing the criteria for impeaching the 
validity of treaties).  It is surprising that those who had construed the formulation 
of clear obligations as a constitutive element of any legal act have simultaneously 
hinted at the idea that a legal act that is not normative is invalid.  See Certain 
Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. at 48 (emphasizing the element of good faith in 
international law). 
177 On the loose content of the prohibition of threats of force, see generally 
Dino Kritsiotis, Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 299 (2009).  
On the prohibition of the treaty of force, see generally F. Dubuisson et A. 
Lagerwall, Que signifie encore l´interdiction de recourir a la menace de la force, in 
L’INTERVENTION EN IRAK ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 83 (Bannelier et al. eds., 2004). 
178 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 
42 (Feb. 20). 
179 Id. at 41-42, para. 72.  For an analysis of this aspect of the case, see Jean 
d’Aspremont, Les dispositions non normatives des actes juridiques conventionnels à la 
lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice, BELGIAN REV. INT’L L. 
496, 518 (2003).  See also BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 172, at 220–21 (noting that 
“some treaty provisions are soft in the sense that they impose no real obligations 
on the parties”). 
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Drawing on the expanding limitations on the prohibition on 
the use of force, the command that it enshrines is being diluted, 
thereby stripping the rule of its ability to voice a clear command to 
states.  This practice accordingly makes it a rule with a soft content 
that recalls the indeterminacy of the rule of equidistance with 
which the I.C.J. previously grappled.  As the recent 
abovementioned case law of the court pertaining to the use of force 
indicates, the court has never likened the prohibition on the use of 
force to the indeterminate principle of equidistance and has 
applied it as if the commands that it contains were of sufficient 
clarity.  In doing so, the court has probably tried to stem the 
dilution of the rule and has entrusted itself with the role of 
guardian.  It is not clear, however, whether the prohibition to use 
force would pass the test of normativity that was applied by the 
court in the Continental Shelf case. 
While this Article has argued that the dilution of the 
prohibition on the use of force mostly amounts to a softening of its 
content through a multiplication and expansion of the limitations 
to that prohibition, it must be acknowledged that the lack of clear 
guidance in relation to the rules has been interpreted differently in 
the legal scholarship.  Liberal scholars, like Thomas Franck, 
understand this kind of softness as a dent in the legitimacy of the 
rule, which in turn can impinge on its efficacy.180  Realist scholars 
have seen the lack of clear guidance as a sign of the desuetude of 
the rule.181  Others, especially scholars affiliated with critical legal 
studies, have seen the indeterminacy of the rule as manifesting a 
retreat to politics, thereby confirming the failure to depoliticize this 
area of inter-state relations.182  While positivist scholars have 
classically endorsed the position advocated above and have not 
 
180 See generally THOMAS N. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (Clarendon Press, 1995) (focusing on concepts of fairness to assess 
international law). 
181 Glennon, supra note 8, at 969 (noting that there is no guidance in 
international law as to where the tipping point occurs between breaking the law 
to desuetude). 
182 See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 566, 574 (1997) (finding that rules become political when they are 
over and under inclusive, as often is the case with international law).  The 
argument is not only made by critical legal scholars. See, e.g, Jan Klabbers, Off 
Limits?  International Law and the Excessive Use of Force, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN 
LAW 59, 67 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol7 
/iss1/art4 (discussing the political dimension of warfare and the inevitability that 
politics will seep into the equation). 
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considered that the clarity of the command of a rule is without any 
impact on its legal quality,183 some have nonetheless considered its 
normative quality instrumental in its legal character.184 
There are thus diverging interpretations of the decomposition 
of the prohibition on the use of force.  However one construes the 
inability of a rule to formulate clear guidance, most scholars will 
see the growing obscurity shrouding the prohibition on the use of 
force as evidence of its incremental dilution.  Against this 
backdrop, it no longer seems far-fetched to contend that the 
current practice has ushered in the demise of the prohibition on the 
use of force, the consequences of which on the international legal 
order must now be appraised. 
5. THE PROSPECT OF A LEGAL ORDER DEVOID OF A CLEAR 
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
The evaporation of the prohibition on the use of force, whether 
through softness, inefficacy, or desuetude, seems compelling.  
Even the I.C.J.—which has not stood idle185 and sometimes taken 
very unorthodox positions to ensure that it is granted the 
opportunity to defend the rule186—has not managed to rein in this 
 
183 See Christakis, supra note 142. 
184 See Robert Ago, Science Juridique et Droit International, 90 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 851, 912, 923–27 (1957) (discussing functional positivism).  His positivist 
theory is further spelled out in Robert Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 
AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1957).  Such a functionalist approach of positivism should not 
be conflated with the realist objection to positivism, which was also denoted as 
‘functional.’  See Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International 
Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260, 274 (1940) (observing that “realist” jurisprudence is 
actually “functional” jurisprudence).  For another author elevating normativity to 
a constitutive element of legality, see Hans Kelsen, Théorie générale du droit 
international public, problèmes choisis, 42 RECUEIL DES COURS 117, 138 (1932). 
185 Some defendant states have relentlessly argued that cases involving the 
use of force are non-justiciable.  For a discussion of this argument and its rejection 
by the court, see Christine Gray, The Use and Abuse of the International Court of 
Justice: Cases Concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 867 
(2003). 
186 For instance, in a very inelegant manner, the court made suspect use of the 
principle of systemic integration enshrined in Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in the Oil Platforms case in order to appraise 
the conduct of the United States in light of the principles pertaining to the use of 
force, whereas the treaty of commerce and navigation which constituted its sole 
ground for jurisdiction was alien to these rules.  See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 
2003 I.C.J. 161, 199 para. 78 (Nov. 6) (holding that use of force here was 
unjustified); Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
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tendency.  Although it is unclear whether it behooves international 
legal scholars to militate for the protection of the collective security 
system,187 many authors have also vigorously reacted against the 
aforementioned practice.188  As with attempts made by the I.C.J., 
the protestations of scholars have not sufficed to avert any further 
subversion of the limitations on the prohibition on the use of force.  
Since the corrosion of the prohibition on the use of force thus looks 
irresistible, it is of great interest to reflect, in the last part of this 
Article, on the possible outcome of its complete demise for the 
international legal order as a whole. 
The exercise that is undertaken in this section would probably 
look odd for those who, like constitutional scholars, have placed 
the prohibition on the use of force and the collective security 
system at the center of the hierarchical and value-based 
understanding of the international legal order.189  Drawing on the 
aforementioned practice, it is argued here that that the following 
undertaking does not constitute a fanciful reflection in any sense.  
The harbingers mentioned above are too serious not to be taken 
into account and we must ponder the possible disappearance of the 
prohibition on the use of force. 
 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279, 280 (2005) (explaining 
that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’s application in Oil Platforms has 
strengthened international law at a critical time when international law was facing 
fragmentation).  For a similar criticism of the court’s judgment in Oil Platforms, see 
Jorg Kammerhofer, Oil’s Well that Ends Well? Critical Comments on the Merits 
Judgment in the Oil Platforms Case, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 695, 696–700 (2004).  For 
another judgment where the court forcefully dealt with issues pertaining to the 
use of force, see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, paras. 
121–39 (Feb. 26) (describing the court’s resort to the sui generis character of the 
situation to which it applied the principle res iudicata in a manner that disregards 
the classical requirements of Article 35 of the Statute). 
187 For some reflections on the role of scholars, see d’Aspremont, supra note 
172. 
188 See Matthew Craven et al., We Are Teachers of International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 363, 363 (2004) (discussing the concept of collective security and self-
defense within the context of the United States’ most recent war in Iraq); see also 
Centre de droit international, Appel de juristes de Droit international concernant le 
recors a la force contre l’Irak, January 2003, available at http://www.humanrights.ch 
/home/upload/pdf/030513_aufruf_f.pdf. 
189 On Constitutionalism in general see TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2007); Richard Collins, Constitutionalism as Liberal-Juridical 
Consciousness: Echoes from International Law’s Past, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 251 (2009); 
Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal 
from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 223 (2006). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/2
D’ASPREMONT.DOC 11/17/2010  2:58 PM 
2010] LIBERALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 1141 
 
The potential consequences of a dilution of the prohibition on 
the use of force for the international legal order could be manifold. 
It could bear upon the legal order itself and on the collective 
security system.  These two distinct dimensions of the fallout of the 
dilution of the prohibition on the use of force are examined below. 
5.1. The International Legal Order 
The prohibition on the use of force is commonly extolled, 
eulogized and, very often, elevated to the higher rank of the norms 
governing the international society to such an extent that its 
disintegration can only be understood by some scholars as a return 
to a pre-1928 Hobbesian state of nature.  This Article argues that 
attempting to gauge the impact of the dilution of the prohibition 
on the use of force does not in any way amount to examining the 
unraveling of the international legal order itself.  It is nonetheless 
true, as is well known, that Hobbes contends that bestowing the 
monopoly of the entitlement to use force upon one sovereign 
constitutes the foundational act of any society and, hence, makes 
the existence of a legal order possible.190  Thus, from a Hobbesian 
vantage point, one may be tempted to believe that the elimination 
of any constraints on the use of force could lead to the demise of 
the legal order itself. 
It is, however, argued here that such an understanding of the 
consequences of the demise of the collective security system would 
be overkill.  First, because it is not at all certain that the vanishing 
of the prohibition to use force would necessarily pave the way for 
utter chaos.  The possibility that States resort to force can be 
curtailed by many non-legal factors, including public opinion,191 
balance of power, or arguments of morality.192  More importantly, 
 
190 Hobbes has been perceived as the precursor of so many radically opposite 
understandings of the international society.  One classical view of Hobbes links 
him to the realist theories of international law.  For a criticism of the neo-realist 
understandings of Hobbes, see Donald W. Hanson, Thomas Hobbes’s “Highway to 
Peace,” 38 INT’L ORG. 329 (1984).  For a neo-Hobbesian understanding of the 
international law-making processes, see d’Aspremont, supra note 58. 
191 See generally Charlotte Ku & Harol K. Jacobson, Toward a Mixed System of 
Democratic Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2003) (suggesting that accountability is one way to moderate the use 
of force). 
192 Klabbers, supra note 182, at 67 (“international humanitarian law attempts 
to pay tribute to moral considerations”). 
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the prohibition on the use of force is not at all a constitutive 
element of any legal order.  A legal order can leave the freedom of 
its subjects to fight each other unfettered without putting its own 
existence into question.  This is easily illustrated by the fact that 
nobody ever contested the legal character of the international order 
when the use of force was only loosely regulated in the framework 
of the League of Nations, before it came to be prohibited by the 
1928 Kellog-Briand Treaty, by customary international law or later 
by the U.N. Charter.193  The prohibition on the use of force—as 
explained earlier—may well be part of what Hart calls the 
minimum content of natural law, that is, some of the rules that 
make a legal order viable.194  But this does not mean that a legal 
order’s existence is dependent on the use of force being prohibited.  
In this sense, a possible disintegration of the prohibition on the use 
of force would not mean reverting to a pre-legal stage where 
international relations were not governed by law.  As was alluded 
to above, it could even be defended that, from an Austinian and 
Kelsenian vantage point, because law boils down to a set of rules 
that can be coercively enforced,195 a greater freedom to resort to 
force can even be seen as enhancing the threat of sanction for 
violations of international law and harden the constraints on which 
the order in question is based. 
5.2. The International Collective Security System 
It has been argued, so far, that the demise of the prohibition on 
the use of force would not undermine the legal character of the 
international order.  Despite the ban on the use of force being 
 
193 See League of Nations Covenant arts. 12–13 & 15–16 (legislating that, in 
the event there is a conflict between two countries, the dispute should be 
submitted to arbitration or the Council for resolution). 
194 HART, supra note 27, at 193–94. 
195 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE 
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 201 (The Noonday Press 1954) (stating that 
the duties the law imposes “are enforced by moral sanctions: by hear on the part 
of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns”); Hans Kelsen, Théorie du Droit 
International Public, 84 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, at 12–13 (1953) (describing the 
function of the law as that of leading mankind to abstain from committing specific 
acts that are deemed to be detrimental and suggesting the infliction of harm on 
those that deviate as a means of enforcing the law); see also Kelsen, supra note 184, 
at 124. (characterizing the law as a system of constraint, with the founding norms 
of the judicial system prescribing said constraint). 
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classically deemed a “cornerstone of the U.N. Charter,”196 this 
Article submits that it is the current collective security system that 
will be the most affected by any dilution of the prohibition on the 
use of force.  It is not that the disappearance of the prohibition on 
the use of force would jeopardize the existence of the collective 
security system.  Rather, it is that the impact of the demise of the 
prohibition on the use of force would bring about a fundamental 
overhaul of the essence of that system.  More precisely, it is argued 
here that the disintegration of the prohibition on the use of force 
will be followed by a radical transformation of the U.N. system. 
To understand the revolutionary impact on the U.N. system 
that could follow a significant dilution of Article 2(4), it is 
important to stress preliminarily that the demise of the prohibition 
on the use of force would certainly not bring about the dissolution 
of the U.N.  First, because even if it is demonstrated that, short of 
the prohibition enshrined in Article 2(4), the U.N. has outlived its 
usefulness, the dissolution of the U.N. still requires the formal 
termination of its constitutive treaty by Member States.197  It is not 
at all certain that States would accept formal termination the U.N. 
Charter even if it were proven that force is no longer prohibited.  
Second, and more importantly, although regulating the use of force 
and maintaining peace and security was originally conceived as 
the overarching function of the organization, the disintegration of 
Article 2(4) would not annihilate the raison d’être of the U.N.  
 
196 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, para. 148 (Dec. 19). 
197 See Articles of Agreement of the World Bank art. VI, Feb. 16, 1989, 60 Stat. 
1457, 2 U.N.T.S. 180 (stating that permanent suspension of World Bank operations 
requires agreement by a majority of the Governors); Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund sec. 2, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 
(demonstrating that there are a few constitutive treaties of international 
organizations that provide for the liquidation of the international organization 
concerned by one of its organs); see also Agreement on the Establishment of the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) art. XIV, Mar. 9, 
1995, 1873 U.N.T.S. 417 (“This Agreement may be amended, terminated, or 
suspended by written agreement of all Executive Board Members, or, if such 
agreement is not achievable by written agreement of a majority of the Executive 
Board Members.”); Kigab Park, Korea Univ., Legal Problems Arising from the 
Dissolution of an International Organization: the Case of the Korean Peninsular 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO): Dissolution de facto or Hibernation?, 
Presentation at the Biennal Conference of the European Society of International 
Law (Sept. 5, 2008) (discussing the legal difficulties pertaining to the situation of 
KEDO). 
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Indeed, the U.N. is not exclusively entrusted with curtailing 
violence in the international arena.  The U.N. performs many other 
tasks, which are only loosely related to the maintenance of peace 
and security.  No State could convincingly claim termination for 
impossibility of performance198 or fundamental change of 
circumstances.199  In this sense, the U.N. would no doubt outlive 
the unraveling of the prohibition on the use of force. 
It follows from the foregoing that, in the case of a dilution of 
Article 2(4), regulatory powers utilized by the organs of the U.N., 
and especially the Security Council, would remain at the disposal 
of the Member States, irrespective of the state of the law regarding 
the use of force.  The use of these regulatory instruments, and 
especially the powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, has 
 
198 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 61: 
1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility 
results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object 
indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is 
temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the 
operation of the treaty. 
2. Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a 
ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation 
of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either 
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation 
owed to any other party to the treaty. 
199 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 62: 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with 
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and 
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence 
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the 
parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is 
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed 
under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty 
establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a 
breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or 
of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the 
treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental 
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing 
from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending 
the operation of the treaty. 
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long surpassed the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  Indeed, the practice of the Security Council within the 
framework of Chapter VII of the Charter has long gone beyond the 
original limits and purposes of the Charter.  For instance, it is no 
longer contested that some of the Security Council’s main 
achievements lie in the non-military measures that it has 
ordered.200  This is well illustrated by the fact that, now, the 
Security Council is mostly using the powers conferred upon it by 
Chapter VII for non-military purposes.  Moreover, the measures 
that are typically ordered by the Security Council are not 
conceived as measures preceding a possible authorization to use 
force.  They are construed as the true end of the Council’s action. 
By virtue of these non-military measures, it is well-known that 
the Council has been implementing all sorts of policies: 
reconstructing States,201 fighting impunity through the creation of 
judicial bodies,202 fighting terrorism through the adoption of 
individual sanctions,203 and so on.  Additional tasks alien to the 
maintenance of peace and security have been conferred upon the 
Council through non-U.N. mechanisms such as the International 
Criminal Court before which proceedings can be ignited by the 
 
200 See generally Vera Gowlland-Debbas, UN Sanctions and International Law: 
An Overview, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) (discussing the debate over the legitimacy and long-
term effects of economic sanctions on states); Tams, supra note 86, at 377 
(discussing the Security Council’s adoption of “general ‘law-making’ resolutions” 
where it has deemed military sanctions unnecessary). 
201 See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 24 (condemning acts of violence against the 
Kosovo population).  See generally Jean d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations 
as Democracy-Building Instruments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008) (discussing the use of 
international organizations to create or reconstruct democratic states); Jean 
d’Aspremont, Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 649, 649 (2007) (arguing that the “proposed regulation of [the] statehood” of 
Kosovo surpassed past international involvement in the reconstruction of States). 
202 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (describing the 
establishment of the ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
(describing the establishment of the ICTY).  See generally S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) (describing the creation of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon). 
203 See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (declaring 
international opposition to the Taliban); S.C. Res. 1135, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1135 
(Oct. 29, 1997) (declaring international opposition to the members of the UNITA 
in Angola). 
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Council.204  This tendency is also underpinned by the current 
debates about entrusting the Council with the responsibility of 
making findings about the existence of crimes of aggression.205  
Overall, the Council has increasingly vacated its role of guardian of 
the order and has focused on problems of justice.  In doing so, the 
“Police” have ventured into the “Temple,” as was famously 
described by Martti Koskenniemi.206  The promotion of justice by 
the Security Council is obviously at odds with the original policing 
role that was reserved to the Council by the authors of the Charter, 
as well as by earlier practice, where classically it was the General 
Assembly that could seek to promote justice on the international 
plane.207  It is nonetheless this role that would enable the collective 
security system to outlive the dilution of the prohibition on the use 
of force. 
It is not only that the relevance of the U.N. system would not 
be jeopardized by a dilution of the prohibition on the use of force.  
This Article also argues that the tendency of the Security Council to 
embrace responsibilities in world regulation and the promotion of 
justice would be dramatically inflated by a dilution of the 
prohibition on the use of force.  Indeed, in the absence of any clear 
prohibition on the use of force, the Council’s responsibility to 
 
204 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing an “independent permanent International Criminal 
Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole”). 
205 See Press Conference, United Nations, Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.un.org/News/briefings 
/docs/2009/090213_ICC.doc.htm (discussing the I.C.C.’s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression).  See generally Niels Blokker, The Crime of Aggression and the 
United Nations Security Council, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 867, 886-87 (2007) (discussing 
the debate over the Security Council’s role in determining I.C.C. jurisdiction, and 
rejecting the view that the determination of whether there has been a crime of 
aggression should be left exclusively to the Security Council). 
206 Koskenniemi, supra note 19, at 328-29. 
207 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (May 1, 1974) 
(defining a new economic order to promote principles of justice and equity among 
states); see also Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. 
Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (prohibiting colonialism in recognition of individual 
rights to equality and self-determination); Request for an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons, G.A. Res. 49/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Dec. 15, 1994) (promoting 
disarmament and requesting that the I.C.J. review the legality of the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons). 
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maintain order and to authorize the use of force to stem threats to 
international peace would ebb.  It would no longer be necessary to 
seek authorization to use force and the maintenance of the 
international peace and order would no longer be dependent on 
the Council.  States, acting unilaterally or on the basis of ad hoc 
coalitions, would be able to maintain order.208  This is probably 
what the idea of coalitions of the willing—which constitutes the 
antithesis of the maintenance of order by the international 
community209—already foreshadows.  Deprived of its main 
responsibilities in the maintenance of order, the Security Council 
would inextricably concentrate on its newer functions (i.e. world 
regulation and the promotion of justice).  It follows that the 
Security Council would not necessarily be a victim of the dilution 
of the prohibition on the use of force and would in fact expand its 
role as a world regulator. 
The idea that the responsibilities of the Security Council as a 
world regulator or a forum of justice may be reinforced by the 
demise of the prohibition on the use of force may, to some extent, 
seem paradoxical, since the dilution of the prohibition on the use of 
force is largely the outcome of States’ confidence in their own 
powers and capabilities.  On the one hand, states could be liberated 
from most constraints on their ability to use force.  On the other 
hand, they would be subjected to a more powerful Council.  This 
paradox must not be exaggerated.  The States that are striving to 
extend the freedom to resort to force are commonly those that are 
at the helm of the Council.  By diluting the prohibition on the use 
of force, these states are fostering their own ability to resort to war 
as well as the international mechanisms by which they can impose 
regulations and promote their own visions of justice. 
However beneficial this may be for the superpowers, it is 
beyond doubt that the demise of the Council’s role as guardian of 
the order would also present one advantage for those states that do 
not classically have a say in its regulation-making processes.  
 
208 See Michael Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16, 
34 (2003) (claiming that States will be able to maintain order without the help of 
the Security Council). 
209 See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Coalitions of the Willing and the Evolution of 
Informal International Law, in COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: AVANTGARDE OR THREAT? 
1 (Christian Calliess et al. eds., 2007) (describing the increasing tendency of “like-
minded states” to use informal processes instead of international law to 
coordinate). 
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Indeed, if stripped of its primary function in regulating the use of 
force, the Council would more clearly appear as what it currently 
is.  Today, under the guise of the collective security system, the 
Council still manages to be portrayed as the guardian of peace and 
order.  All of its actions are justified by reference to that precise 
goal despite the fact that the determination of a situation as 
constituting a threat to the peace boils down to a mere formality210 
and its powers are used for all sorts of different goals which are 
only loosely connected to the maintenance of peace and security.  If 
someday the Council is deprived of its primary function as a result 
of the unraveling of the prohibition on the use of force, it will 
become more apparent that the Security Council has become a real 
world regulator. 
Laying bare and reinforcing this crude reality of a Security 
Council turned into a world regulator would undoubtedly cause 
some unease.  It is uncontested that, as a forum of justice and as a 
world regulator, the Council has proved to be an ill-equipped and 
inappropriate body.  It suffices to mention the debates about the 
sanctions against individuals suspected of involvement in 
international terrorism-related activities211 or the reluctance to 
extend the role of the Security Council in international criminal 
proceedings.212  Preserving a Council exclusively focused on 
regulating the world and promoting justice would be contingent 
upon dramatically reforming the Council.213  While the collective 
security system has provided the illusion that we can live in a 
world where security is the responsibility of a handful of veto-
wielding States enjoying wide discretionary powers,214 laying bare 
 
210 See d’Argent, supra note 28, at 1145–46 (noting that the Security Council’s 
responsibility under Article 39 to determine whether a situation constitutes a 
threat relies on the maintenance of peace and international security). 
211 See, e.g., d’Aspremont & Dopagne, supra note 71, at 375–76 (describing the 
problems caused by the implementation of U.N. Security Council measures in the 
European legal order). 
212 See Press Conference, United Nations, supra note 205 (describing the 
recent debates in the special study group on aggression). 
213 See also Stromseth, supra note 5, at 629 (“We are . . . at a difficult and 
precarious transitional moment in the international legal system governing the 
use of force . . .”). 
214 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 24 (Aug. 10, 2005) (discussing the discretion of the 
Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to, or a breach of, the 
peace).  Contra Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 29 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
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the crude reality of its global regulatory position would spark a 
compelling and irresistible need for reform—especially in terms of 
transparency, due process, and participation. 
Does the foregoing mean that we should rejoice at the dilution 
of the prohibition on the use of force because it could eventually 
reinforce the calls for greater transparency, due process, and 
participation in the collective security system?  Not necessarily.  
First, a larger leeway for resorting to war could pave the way for 
an increase in violence despite the existence of non-legal 
constraints through public opinions, economic parameters, or even 
morality.  Second, we need to bear in mind that the highly needed 
reform of the Council has long proved politically unfeasible.215  
Hence, it is not certain that, in the absence of such reform, a 
Council exclusively transformed into a world legislator by virtue of 
the complete liberalization of the use of force would be able to 
wield its powers with the same legitimacy and efficacy.  If an 
increased inefficacy of the Council is the price to be paid for 
removing the veil under which it has been acting since the end of 
the Cold War, it may be wiser to continue to live under the illusion 
of an international legal order where force is strictly prohibited and 
its use carefully supervised by the Security Council. 
 
215 See UN Begins Talks on Realigning Security Council, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 
20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/americas 
/20iht-nations.4.20340168.html (discussing the new round of talks about reform of 
the Security Council that were ignited after the failure of the 2005 Summit to 
address the reform of the Council).  See also Francois Murphy, France, UK want 
Interim Change to UN Body–Sarkozy, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2009, available at 
http://in.reuters.com/article/economicNews/idINIndia-37489320090116 
(discussing President Sarkozy’s proposal that the only reform within reach is an 
informal agreement among veto-wielding powers to share their seats, particularly 
among European members). 
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